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                                       SUMMARY 
After the tragic incidents of September 11, where the destruction of the twin towers of 
New York’s World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon were caused by the hijack of 
civilian aircraft from US airports, one of the immediate decisions by the US 
government was the federalising of all aviation security screener functions at all US 
airports, reversing years of privatisation. It established a Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) that controlled the security functions at these airports and had 
wide ranging powers. 
 
It ignited an old long-running debate in the US and elsewhere about the extent of 
privatisation in the security of strategic assets. It renewed a more recent debate in the 
rest of the world of the merits of privatisation, a worldwide push that gathered speed 
from the 1970s.The debate continues. As recently as  May 2004, the Homeland 
Security Department told Congress that federal airport screeners were no better – or 
worse – than private screeners, based on its own study, and audits by the General 
Accounting Office and a private firm. All three described the Transportation Security 
Administration as an unresponsive, inflexible bureaucracy that is failing to provide an 
adequate level of security.  
Expectedly, the rest of the world did not all follow the US example and had different 
approaches to this problem. Some voiced concern and scepticism at the US efforts. It 
raises the question of whether this was a correct move by the US or whether it could 
have been done in a modified way along the lines of successful models in other nations 
with a longer history of fighting aviation terrorism. 
 
 vi 
This research has one main objective – to critically review key models of privatisation 
of aviation security and to determine if there is indeed a benchmark or model to follow 
for all nations grappling with the eternal balance between freedom and security, and 
for the aviation security industry particularly, the balance between facilitation and 
security. 
 
This thesis involves a study of the threats against civil aviation, the trends and 
processes of privatisation, the trends in airport development that complicate security 
measures, the worldwide trends in the privatisation of aviation security forces and the 
different approaches by various governments. It takes an in-depth look at several key 
models of aviation security particularly those that have an international and regional 
impact such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, those that are under siege by 
terrorists, such as India and Sri Lanka and those that are in similar situations as 
Singapore as aviation hubs such as Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, where there is a 
pressing need to balance security with the pleasure and speed of travel. 
 
This is done through a review of documents, conference papers, publications and 
interviews with key personnel and a compilation of the author’s own 27 years of 
airline industry experience, in particular the 10 years as head of an aviation security 
unit at Singapore Airport and positions on the boards of The International Association 
of Airport and Seaport Police, The International Society for Crime Prevention 
Practitioners and Aviation Security International magazine. It ends with a proposal of a 
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                                             CHAPTER ONE 
 
                                            INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PRIVATISATION IN AVIATION SECURITY:  THE POST             
SEPTEMBER 11 CONCERNS   
   
For a long time, from the 1970s, the constant refrain amongst policy makers was the 
mantra of privatisation (Miller 1997). This was not only about the privatisation of 
obvious operations such as power plants, transportation networks and terminals but 
also of what are often regarded as “inherently government functions” such as 
protection of state assets, war operations (Fidler and Catan 2003), prison management 
and other aspects of criminal justice and social services (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). 
 
In the field of aviation, this was particularly pronounced because in large parts of the 
world, the aviation industry was launched by governments who saw it as a strategic 
asset and a public service (Doganis 1985). So when privatisation was touted as a better 
way to run all manner of activities, there was a significant impact on aviation, with 
scores of airports, airlines and aerospace industries sold off (Harbison 2002). 
 
While the privatisation process itself was largely successful, there was a contradictory 
trend in the security arrangements for these assets. This was because of the use of 
aviation, from the 60s and 70s, as a target by terrorists and other criminal organisations 
to extract demands or draw attention to their cause (Alexander and Sochor 1990, 
Cooper 1991, Stephens 1997). So the state had to get very involved in aviation 
security. Some took over all the functions while others had regulatory and policy-
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making bodies that monitored private and semi-private security forces. Airlines and 
other private aviation organisations also felt the weight of increased security and 
appealed to governments to carry the burden, as it is a defence of a state target (Moore 
1991). 
 
In the US, however, there was great resistance by the government to take over these 
functions and great reluctance by private organisations at taking security seriously 
(Teamsters 1995, President’s Commission 1990, White House Commission 1996, The 
9/11 Commission 2004). This deadly combination was one of the main reasons for the 
tragic incidents of September 11, where the destruction of the twin towers of New 
York’s World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon were caused by the hijack of 
civilian aircraft from US airports. One of the immediate decisions by the US 
government was the federalising of all aviation security screener functions at all US 
airports, reversing years of privatisation and recognising the poor performance of 
private security. It established a Transportation Security Administration that controlled 
the security functions at these airports and had wide-ranging powers (Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act 2001, Sengupta 2001). 
 
The event launched extensive and intense discussions on two related issues: an old 
contentious debate in the US and elsewhere about the extent of privatisation in the 
security of strategic assets and a more recent debate in the rest of the world of the 
merits of privatisation, particularly with some spectacular failures such as British Rail 
(Crompton and Jupe 2002). Sengupta (2001) highlights this debate as a “creeping 
realisation among many countries that a bigger role for government and the public 
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sector is not such a bad thing after all. More soberly, there is a growing recognition 
that their very security depends upon more effective government-run public services”. 
 
The post-mortem after September 11 showed the inadequacies of the privatised 
arrangements in the US aviation sector and the lack of clout for the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), the government agency with jurisdiction over airports. Since 
the early 70s, two US presidential commissions and many reports of supervisory 
bodies, private organisations and the media have repeatedly highlighted the defects in 
airport security and recommended federalisation of airport security whereby a federal 
government agency with law enforcement powers should directly handle security with 
its own personnel (Consumers Union 2002). These recommendations were repeatedly 
watered down, partly because of intense lobbying by vested interests such as airlines 
who wanted to keep costs low and state and county governments who wanted to retain 
control of the airports they were managing and the fact that the dominant philosophy in 
the government and the US Congress was to cut back on government services and push 
for privatisation. More federal personnel and expenditure were condemned as big 
government and harmful for private enterprise (Teamsters 1995). 
 
Sengupta (2001) cites prominent US economist, Paul Krugman, who pointed out that, 
if the fire services had been privatised, each contract would have led to fire-fighting 
only for individual buildings while the fire would have spread all over and concludes 
by commenting on the airport security dispute: “The Right’s fanatical distrust of 
government is the central fact of American politics, even in a time of terror”. So 
Sengupta laments that “the people should be put at risk to see that federal functions 
and expenditure do not expand”. Of course, the failure of private companies does not 
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necessarily mean that privatisation itself is to blame. A closer analysis of the US 
situation will reveal many other reasons and cite many other examples where private 
companies have done well (Moore 1991). 
The jury is still out. As recently as 5 May 2004, the Associated Press reported that the 
Homeland Security Department's chief investigator, Inspector General Clark Kent 
Ervin, told Congress that federal airport screeners were no better – or worse – than 
private screeners. He based his report on his department’s own study, and audits by the 
General Accounting Office and a private firm. The government reports found airport 
security was lax and all three described the Transportation Security Administration as 
overly bureaucratic. The committee's ranking Democrat said it showed that passenger 
screening is no better than it was 17 years ago. The studies portrayed the TSA as an 
unresponsive, inflexible bureaucracy that is failing to provide an adequate level of 
security (Aviation Daily 2002). Even now, there are moves to devolve some security 
functions back to private firms (Bovard 2004). 
Expectedly, the rest of the world did not all follow the US example and not only had 
different approaches to this problem, particularly in Europe and Israel (Jenkins 2002), 
but expressed scepticism at the US approach (Everitt 2002). So it raises the question of 
whether this was a correct move by the US and the debate continues (Bovard 2004). 
All are continuing to watch the developments in the US. 
 
1.2      OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate different models of privatisation in 
aviation security, the features in the aviation and security industries that determine the 
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type of model chosen, glean the factors for success and propose a framework or guide 
to use in decisions over the ideal model for an aviation security regime for a particular 
country. 
The first phase was to investigate the trends in privatisation of aviation security in key 
countries. The research looked at literature that provided the background to state 
involvement and privatisation in general and in the aviation industry, the attacks on 
aviation that elevated state involvement in the security arrangements for aviation, the 
varied developments in the aviation industry itself that made this problem more 
complex and the different responses by states.  
The second phase was to identify, through literature reviews and hands-on personal 
knowledge through attendance at conferences and operational and professional 
involvements in this issues by the author, of models that work. This involved an 
analysis of the success of different models and the industry perception of what made 
them work. The ultimate test – the prevention of or failure to prevent a terrorist attack 
is not a fair basis as there could be a number of other reasons why an attack can take 
place. The final judgement of success is industry perceptions of a successful 
combination of security and facilitation. Detections can also be used but such 
information is classified so it was not possible to obtain such statistics. 
 
1.3 MOTIVATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
The fact that the debate even amongst the US officials continues as to the extent of 
privatisation shows that there is a need to look at this issue in greater depth. Many 
nations are grappling with the right model or arrangement. 
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The concerns are with the process of privatisation itself in the transportation sector, 
with some cases of failures such as with British Rail, and with the need for an effective 
response to the targeting of aviation by terrorist groups. Most governments are 
convinced of the need for state control but do not wish to have too many resources tied 
down in one sector and are mindful of the need to address the fear of financial and 
commercial inefficiencies. 
 
Very critical in aviation is the need to balance security and facilitation and hence the 
need to have the right combinations of state and private sector involvement to arrive at 
the ideal balance. 
 
1.4     BRIEF REVIEW OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The review of literature revolved around the subjects of the growth of aviation, the 
process of privatisation itself, the history of privatisation in aviation, developments in 
aviation security and the structure of aviation security regimes. 
 
While there have been considerable studies in privatisation and on aviation, there are 
not many scholarly works on aviation security. Even the few that are available are 
more compilation of processes and events than theoretical models or frameworks. 
Kenneth Moore produced in 1976 (and updated in 1991) what was the first definitive 
compilation on aviation security – a condensation of its history, threats, processes, 
procedures and problems. Then there were the works by Cooper (1991), Wallis (1993), 
Alexander and Sochor (1990), Abeyratne (1998) and Wilkinson and Jenkins (1999). 
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Hence the reliance has been on a review of literature on privatisation and aviation to 
provide a brief backdrop and major reliance on the few textbooks on aviation security, 
training material, conference papers, government documents, media reports, interviews 
of key officials, and the author’s own experience in the subject gleaned from 
operational deliberations, presentations and attendance at conferences. 
The airline industry has undergone an expansion unrivalled by any other form of 
public transport, its rate of technological change exceptional and its impact and 
influence, extraordinary (Doganis 1985). The nature of its growth and its cross-border 
operations also led to heavy government involvement and international politics 
(Sochor 1991, Abeyratne 1998). Its history has been well documented and some brief 
details are provided in Chapter 2.2.  
The history of aviation security and its early unglamorous beginnings were less well 
documented until aviation was thrust into the frontlines of the war on terror when it 
was used as a target by terrorists. (Moore 1991, Donovan 1994). This is elaborated in 
Chapter 2.1. There are also wide ranges of studies on terrorism against aviation but it 
was sufficient to focus on those aspects that had an impact on the nature of aviation 
security regimes and the need for state direction (Alexander and Sochor 1990, Wallis 
1993, Wilkinson and Jenkins 1999). 
Privatisation processes are elaborated in Chapter 2.3 and have been well researched 
and documented. Some studies looked at the history of state involvement and 
privatisation (Yergin & Stanislaw 1999), definitions (Miller 1997), processes and 
stages (Watson and Heeby 2002), specific country studies such as Heracleous (1999) 
on Singapore, successes and failures, such as studies on British Rail  (Crompton and 
Jupe 2002). 
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As privatisation of state-owned businesses really took off in the UK, under Margaret 
Thatcher (Miller 1997, Gerald 2003), much of the early work on privatisation was 
about the UK successes, such as those by M Pirie (1985), touted as a leading apostle of 
privatisation. These works were condensed in subsequent research studies and it was 
sufficient to peruse a few of these such as Burton, John (1987), Burton, Kenneth 
(1994), Samson (1994), Heracleous (1999), Hodge (2000), Crompton and Jupe (2002) 
and Gerber (2002).  
The current focus of research is on the failures of privatisation or the need to move 
away from the UK model of unbridled privatisation and towards a combination of 
public and private participation (Esler 2004, Teo 2004, Gerber 2002, Murugason 
2004). Most of the current studies on privatisation in airports were from conference 
papers (Asian Airports 2002, 2003 and 2004) and ICAO publications and were mostly 
of an operational or business nature. 
As knowledge generation in the field of aviation security is primarily an operational 
and political rather than academically driven process, a major source of information is 
from the papers generated by the deliberations and decisions of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and governments. These spent considerable research 
hours setting out the history, current implications and future directions of international 
and national aviation security needs. The US presidential commissions, the recent 9/11 
commission, the reports to the UK House of Commons, the New Zealand government 
audits and reviews all provided a rich source of information, albeit without any 
theoretical or conceptual frameworks or threads.  
Another significant source was conferences. The major one would be the annual 
conference jointly hosted by the three key organisations – ICAO, Airports Councils 
 9 
International (ACI) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Then 
there are the regional events such as the biennial aviation security conference 
organised by SATS Security (a Singapore Airlines subsidiary), meetings of non-
governmental organisations such as the International Association of Airport and 
Seaport Police, and commercial events such as Airport Expo. The Asian Aerospace in 
Singapore and air shows in Farnborough, Paris and Langkawi and other aviation events 
also had security symposiums on the sidelines or as part of the proceedings. 
These sources also provided the material for two important aspects of this study – the 
impact on the nature of aviation security by the unique challenges in aviation (Chapter 
3.1), the consequent different alternatives to aviation security (Chapter 3.2) and the 
specific country studies in Chapter 4. 
 
1.5      STUDY FRAMEWORK AND ORGANISATION  
The study first looked at the historical background to aviation and aviation security, 
the history of state involvement and privatisation efforts in aviation security, the 
different processes or stages of privatisation, the trends in airport development and 
how all this make an impact on the alternative approaches or decisions about 
organisational structure, cost recovery and state involvement. 
 
Then the focus was on specific countries whose models have an impact on the world 
and the region that Singapore is in. The final section is an analysis of what appear to be 
the better models and what are the factors for success. 
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The conceptual framework revolves around the complex nature of aviation security – 
the  nature  of government  involvement,  the impact of  privatisation, the commercial 
pressures  as  a  result of privatisation, the development of  airports as commercial 
centres,  and  the impact of  the choice of aviation  as a terrorist target. All  weave 
together  to determine the nature of privatisation in aviation security and the interplay 
between government involvement and private sector participation. 
 
The development of this study therefore revolves around this approach – the history 
of aviation security in Chapter 2.1 and how it ensured international and national 
attention to aviation security, the history of privatisation in aviation security in 
Chapter 2.2 and how the industry had to grapple with the contradictory trend of a 
privatising industry but an increasing state involvement in security, how both these 
processes influenced the stages of privatisation that led to unique public-private 
partnerships (Kumar 1992, Teo 2004, Esler 2004) as elaborated in Chapter 2.3, the 
consequent unique challenges in aviation security (Chapter 3.1), the resultant 
alternative approaches as expounded in Chapter 3.2, and the results as seen in 
different country systems in Chapter 4. 
 
The concept of complexity helps to highlight the differences in aviation compared to 
other transport modes and how traditional and successful solutions in these other 
modes did not and could not result in complete application in aviation. It also helps 
understand the final conclusion to this study, that while there are universal principles 
that apply in every situation, the final solution for each country must be a unique 




Another but similar conceptual approach is that used by ICAO in all its deliberations: 
facilitation – the central role of the aviation industry was to facilitate the safe and 
speedy movement of people and goods across the skies. Central to this concept is the 
need to balance speed and pleasure with safety and security and it will be seen that the 























BACKGROUND TO PRIVATISATION IN AVIATION SECURITY 
2.1 HISTORY OF AVIATION SECURITY  
         
The history of aviation security begins with the usual arrangements by the owners to 
protect against theft, trespass, stowaways and so on. Ownership of the assets will 
determine who provides the security – be it governments, government-owned 
organisations or private companies (Moore 1991). 
 
The earliest known act of air piracy occurred in 1932, when hijackers took over a 
Peruvian aircraft but it was treated as a criminal case and soon passed into history 
(Alexander and Sochor 1998, Elphinstone and Hancock 2001,Stephens 1997). The 
increasing threat of war in the 1930s and the final outbreak of World War Two and the 
realisation that airports and aviation assets were key targets in war led to greater 
government involvement in the protection of aviation assets  (Donovan 1991).  
 
In the late Forties, there were numerous incidents of individuals escaping or attempting 
to escape from behind the Iron Curtain by hijacking aircraft and there was one reported 
incident in 1949, also behind the Iron Curtain, of the destruction of commercial airlines 
with 36 killed (Moore 1991). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the first shockwaves of 
world terrorism using aviation started, with the spate of hijackings to Cuba and the 
hijacks by Palestinian terrorist groups. Then there were attacks at airports and on 
airline offices (Elphinstone and Hancock 2001). 
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It led to an initial round of tightened security, which was generally limited to metal 
detectors near the boarding piers for ticket holders, and to the examination of incoming 
baggage. The rest of the terminal remained open to visitors and passengers alike. By 
and large the perimeter of the typical airport was guarded by nothing more 
sophisticated than a chain-link fence. Service personnel – including aircraft operations 
area personnel with ready access to aircraft, such as those engaged in refuelling, 
baggage handling, housekeeping and the delivery of on-board food and beverages – 
were subjected to little if any security clearance (Fitzgerald 2002).  
 
Though the number of hijacks declined after 1972, the impact grew greater because of 
larger aircraft and a higher number of passengers. Then the trend of bombs on board 
sent a chill through the aviation community, with the destruction of Air India, Pan Am, 
UTA and Avianca aircraft (Moore 1991). 
 
Finally, September 11 2001 saw the most terrifying tactic, the commandeering of 
aircraft and crashing them into strategic targets to inflict maximum casualties and gain 












Table 1: Overview of development of aviation security 
 
Year Event International/National Action 
1932 First recorded hijack of 
Peruvian aircraft 
 
1944  Chicago Convention 
1945  IATA founded 
1947  ICAO founded 
1949 First recorded destruction of 




Spate of hijackings by persons 
fleeing communism 
 
1963  Tokyo Convention 
1968 First terrorist hijack of 
commercial airline – El Al, 22 
July to 1 September 
Spate of hijackings to Cuba 
(19) 
IFALPA action on hostages 
1969 Continuation of hijackings to 
Cuba 
Committee on Unlawful 
Interference established 
   
1970 Hijacking of TWA, Swissair, 
Pan Am and BOAC aircraft 
and destruction at Dawson 
Field, Jordan 
Formation of IATA Security 
Advisory Committee 
Hague Convention 
1971  Montreal Convention 




 Introduction of passenger 
screening, sky marshalls and 
other security measures for 
international flights 
1972 JRA assault at Lod Airport, 
Israel, 23 killed, 70 wounded 
Cathay Pacific aircraft 
destroyed in flight, 81 killed 
 
1974 Start of terrorist bombings of 
airline offices 
TWA aircraft destroyed in 
flight, 88 killed 
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1975  Annex 17 to Convention first 
issued 
1977 Lufthansa aircraft hijacked, 
incident terminated by armed 
assault by German GSG 9 
 
1978  Bonn Declaration 
1979  AACC (ACI) and IATA 
establish a Joint Aviation 
Security and Facilitation 
Working Group 
1980-82 High point in terrorist attacks 
against civil aviation. 
(105 attacks in three years) 
 
1983 Gulf Air aircraft destroyed in 
flight, 112 killed 
 
   
1985 Air India Flight 182 aircraft 
destroyed in flight, 329 killed 
TWA Flight 847 hijacked, 
Lebanon 
Simultaneous terrorist attacks 
at Rome and Vienna airports 
Ad hoc Group Experts on 
Aviation Security met in 
August to rewrite Annex 17. 
[Issued in May 1986] 
Baggage reconciliation 




 FAC established and assume 
responsibility for 
implementation of airport 
security measures 
1987 Korean Airlines Flight 858 
destroyed in flight, 115 killed. 
100% screening of domestic 
flights introduced in Australia. 
First meeting of ICAO 
Aviation Security Panel 
(Replaced Committee on 
Unlawful Interference) 
 
1988 Kuwait Airways Flight 422 
hijacked - 16 days duration. 
Pan Am Flight 103 destroyed 
over Lockerbie, Scotland - 
269 people killed 
Montreal Protocol 
1989 UTA Flight 772 destroyed in 
flight - 171 people killed. 
Increased R&D effort to detect 
explosives and harden aircraft 
 16 
Avianca Airlines aircraft 




1990  Presidents Commission on 
Aviation Security & Terrorism. 




Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives 
1993  Fifth Edition of Annex 17 
effective (43 standards) 
   
1994 IRA Mortar attack on 
Heathrow Airport, UK 
Air France hijacked by 
Algerian extremists. French 
commandos terminated 
incident in Marseille 
 
1996 Ethiopian Airlines B767 
hijacked and crashed into sea 
when aircraft ran out of fuel - 
123 people killed. 
Explosion aboard TWA Flight 
800 - All passengers and crew 
killed. 
 
Fifth Edition of ICAO Security 
Manual issued 
 
Gore Commission established 
by US President. 
1997 
 
 Sixth Edition of Annex 17 
effective (47 standards) 
2001 The September 11 tragedy The 9/11 Commission 








2.2 HISTORY OF PRIVATISATION IN AVIATION SECURITY 
2.2.1    Introduction  
 
The history of the privatisation of aviation security follows closely the trends in the 
aviation industry itself, the prevailing economic philosophies and policies and the 
security threats against aviation. (Doganis 1991). 
  
Early commercial aviation, because of strategic and cost factors, was invariably 
connected to government policies and practices. Airports, often converted from 
military airfields, were built by governments, and airlines flew the flag, representing 
their countries of origin and often funded by governments. Aircraft purchases were 
usually linked to defence needs or national aerospace industries (Sochor 1991). Hence, 
the security arrangements for these assets – airports, airlines, hangars, cargo terminals 
and other airport facilities- were often arranged by the state as protection of state assets 
through the establishment of state police or security units. 
 
2.2.2   The beginning of State involvement 
 
Government involvement in aviation formally began in 1910 when the French 
Government convened the Paris Conference as a result of German balloons making 
flights above French territory. The pre World War 1 tensions prevented this conference 
from making any headway but it allowed the exploration of various options as to how 




The First World War that subsequently erupted from 1914 to 1918 brought these 
realities to a head. Soon after the war, on 8 February 1919, the first scheduled air 
service between Paris and London started and demonstrated the need to establish a 
formal international code of regulation. This was done later the same year at the 
Second Paris Convention, the first of numerous Conventions, which together form the 
primary source of modern aviation regulations, including all aspects of Aviation 
Security. Doganis rightly pointed out “ When the Paris Convention, signed in 1919, 
accepted that states have sovereign rights in the air space above their territory, direct 
government intervention in air transport became inevitable”(p 25). 
  
The key convention was the Chicago Convention of 1944, which established the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and promulgated a number of 
annexes to the Agreement, including Annex 17 on Aviation Security. However, these 
agreements were only recommendations and were not binding on states as to how they 
will set up their aviation security regimes. These were largely determined by the extent 
of government involvement in aviation activities and worldwide trends in private 
sector involvement. (ICAO Annex 17). 
 
  
KLM, the oldest airline still flying in the world, was registered in 1919 with 
participation from the Dutch business and banking community, a grant from the Dutch 
royalty (Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina) to use the "Royal" prefix and the full backing 
and clout from the Dutch government. Since then, the Dutch government has been 




Qantas, the next oldest airline, was launched in 1920 and saw less government 
involvement in the initial funding but as it grew, it too became an instrument of 
government activity in aviation (Elphinstone and Hancock 2001). 
 
2.2.3 The UK experience 
 
What happened in the UK was of considerable significance to the rest of the world 
particularly the British Empire and Commonwealth, whose dominions and colonies 
modelled themselves after the mother country.  
 
Soon after commercial aviation was launched in 1919, French air companies were 
growing quickly and the significant route across the English Channel between Paris 
and London was heavily subsidised by the French Government. The British 
Government chose not to give British airlines a subsidy. Winston Churchill, as 
Secretary of State for Air, told British companies they would have to "fly by 
themselves" and had a dim view of the fledgling airline industry. This shortsighted 
decision effectively put the British commercially out of the running on cross-Channel 
operations. European airlines were winning on all international routes 
(www.airlineshistory.com). 
 
Eventually the government convened the Civil Air Transport Subsidies Committee 
(called the Hambling Committee) to set up a genuine subsidy policy for British air 
companies in an effort to regain British standing in Europe. The Hambling Committee 
decided a national airline was needed as the central flag-carrier for Britain and the 
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existing four private airlines were to merge to form this new airline. It would receive a 
one million pound subsidy over ten years to fly nationally required routes. It would 
have to 'Buy British' aircraft and engines and fly 'heavier-than-air' equipment and 
therefore no airships. 
 
The new company Imperial Air Transport Company Limited incorporated the new 
airline as Imperial Airways Limited. The independent airlines were actually doing 
fairly well financially when the merger was forced on them and there was much 
criticism of the policy to form the world's first national flag carrier airline. Imperial 
Airways concentrated on its much-famed 'Empire routes' to and through Africa, 
Australia and India, in the first ten years of its existence and it helped to inspire, shape 
and forge the airline industries of the many British Empire nations it served. But it 
ignored Europe. 
In the 1930s, unhappiness with the state airline, particularly over services to Europe, 
led to the start of more private airlines. In 1935, two main international independent 
airlines and some smaller ones emerged to take up the challenge of linking Britain with 
Europe. The big two – British Airways and British Continental - eventually merged as 
British Airways. 
However, the British government went one step further. When it noted the poor 
performance of Imperial Airways in Europe and saw British Airways as the primary 
mover in Europe, in October 1938 it proposed a forced merger of the two to more 
effectively meet the European challenge. On 24 November 1939 the state airline 
concept was passed as a parliamentary bill and became law. The assets of British 
Airways and Imperial Airways were merged to give a combined fleet of 82 aircraft. 
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Thus the new national flag carrier was forced into existence: British Overseas Airways 
Corporation. This would result in the world’s first fully state-owned nationalised flag 
carrier, a model that set the trend all over the world, particularly in the colonies of the 
Imperial powers, which replicated the arrangements of the ruling country.  
 
2.2.4 The difference between the US and Europe  
 
The major difference was between Europe and its empires and the United States of 
America and its colonies. In Europe, socialist thinking, with the Communists at one 
extreme and Western Europe somewhere in the middle, led governments to see air 
transport as an essential service to the economy and the public and a source of 
employment and therefore justifying government subsidies, support, ownership and 
protection (Doganis 1991). 
  
Doganis wrote about the concept that air transport is a public utility or at least a quasi-
public utility. The benefits to the economy and the consequences of chaos are so great 
that the industry needs to be regulated particularly in view of the fact that the 
implications go beyond economics and into strategic, social and political areas. This 
perception of the strategic importance of civil aviation has resulted in most 
governments owning airports and developing national, monopolistic airlines. This 
helped them avoid a conflict between private commercial needs and national interests.  
This was echoed by Sochor (1991): “In a broader context, political conflicts in aviation 
are inherent in an industry geared to sovereign states eager to show their flag around 
the world…Over the years, commercial aviation has had to serve the political and 
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economic interests of states”. Economics and politics themselves are interlinked with 
military and strategic considerations, and issues such as environment protection (that 
is, airport curfews and noise control). Hence, international civil aviation differs from 
other industries in that it is also closely linked to national security and military 
interests as well as to the sovereignty and prestige of almost all countries of the world. 
 
 Given the importance of aviation as an instrument of economic, military and foreign 
policy, it was not surprising that civil aviation developed under extensive government 
control through restrictive national regulations and the outright ownership or control of 
the airlines. The privately owned US carriers were the only exception. Yet they too 
depended on the government for subsidies and political support (Sochor 1991). 
Another writer cited by Sochor, A.F. Lowenfeld, said: “international aviation is not 
just another problem in a changing economic system, though it is that; international 
civil aviation is a serious problem in international relations, affecting the way 
governments view one another, the way individual citizens view their own and foreign 
countries, and in a variety of direct and indirect connections the security arrangements 
by which we live”. 
  
In the United States of America, with its tradition of a deep distrust of government, 
civil aviation was seen as an essentially commercial activity with the free market 
deciding the scope and extent of the activity. And this thinking, of course, extended to 
the security for these assets (Teamsters 1995,Sengupta 2002). The tone of American 
approaches to aviation was set by Suchor’s report on what then US President 
Roosevelt said to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at a conference in Quebec 
in August 1943 – air transport should be in private ownership (Page 5). 
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This divide became more pronounced after World War Two as seen in the two 
conflicting approaches at the 1944 Chicago Convention. The Americans, with their  
civil aviation industry  largely unscathed and much larger and better equipped than 
anyone else’s, wanted an “open skies” policy and were supported by states such as the 
Netherlands or Sweden whose airlines would have to depend on fifth freedom traffic 
because their home base was so small. However, the larger nations severely affected 
by the war, such as the United Kingdom and France and most European countries, 
wanted tight controls on tariffs and capacity and the limitation of fifth freedom rights. 
These different approaches also extended to the way the airline industry was owned 
and operated. 
  
However, even in America, because of strategic considerations and the large capital 
costs of airport development, there has been some state involvement. As far back as 
1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act was introduced to regulate and control competition 
between US domestic carriers. An absence of regulation had led to chaotic economic 
conditions, little security for investors and low safety margins. For many years the 
American view was that while air transport is not a natural monopoly, some regulation 
is required to protect the public from adverse consequences.  
 
As a result, in America and in many parts of the world, there was a wide variation in 
the ownership and operation of airports. They could be public, semi-public or totally 
private. If public or semi-public, ownership or operation could be by a city, county, 
state or special authority like the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority. Since 
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security is deemed to be the duty of owners, the security force could be state, authority 
or local police or private security companies (Teamsters 1995). 
 
2.2.5 The push for privatisation  
 
However, worldwide since the 70s, there has been a shift to privatisation with the 
failure of state enterprises, the success of private businesses especially in America and 
the thinking that private sector operation in all sectors of the economy will lead to 
greater efficiencies. (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Since aviation started out as largely 
state-funded activities, it saw the greatest impact of privatisation moves, with scores of 
airports and airlines sold or corporatised. Consequently there was a similar impact on 
the security forces with many converted to private forces. 
  
Similarly, the nature of aviation security influenced government involvement. The 
early arrangements for security were primarily anti-crime measures - against theft, 
sabotage, trespass, etc. However with the Cuban hijackings of the fifties and the 
Palestinian hijacking of the 70s, aviation was seen as a strategic target that could no 
longer be left to the private sector (Moore 1991). Despite this, the resistance in 
America against state involvement continued, until September 11. In Europe and 
elsewhere, because aviation security regimes had heavy state involvement, there was 
not the same knee-jerk reaction and even now some are continuing the pace of 
privatisation (Sengupta 2002). 
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2.3 THE PROCESS OF PRIVATISATION 
2.3.1   Definitions of privatisation  
    
In a narrow sense, privatisation refers to the transfer of assets from the public to the 
private sector. Another definition is that it is the process of attracting private 
investment and participation into areas hitherto within the purview of governmental 
functions (Anuradha 2001). A somewhat broader definition will include deregulatory 
measures that open up former public sector monopolised markets to private sector 
competition with such deregulation often preceding the transference of ownership of 
the public sector supplier to private ownership. 
 
As a term, it has often been applied to designate a practical solution to a number of 
social problems that began to be pinpointed in the UK and the USA in the late 1970s: 
inefficiency, low productivity, international economic and military decline, 
bureaucracy and red tape, 'big government', excessive trade union power and the 
dependency of the poor on the state (Samson 2001). 
 
 All generally agree that there is no simple, internationally applicable recipe for 
privatisation; various legal methods, business models and organisational structures can 
be used to privatise state owned enterprises. With the different circumstances in each 
country, there is no specific unique model for privatisation and each country designs 
its own model according to its situation. 
 
In this regard, Heracleous (1999) did an interesting study on the Singapore experience 
in privatisation that showed how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could use privatised 
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principles and be as efficient. Singapore Telecoms and other government-owned 
entities were cited as cases where state ownership combined with several contextual 
factors such as a clear corporate strategy and an efficiency focus by the organisations, 
combined with a long-term national policy of infrastructure improvement and a robust 
economic and regulatory environment, led to sustained world-class performance. This 
was achieved in spite of global trends such as deregulation and technological 
advancement, which reduced profitability in the telecommunications industry.  
 
ICAO calls the privatisation process a transfer to autonomous authority. Miller (2003)  
writes, “Privatisation is one of the most significant global economic, social and 
political trends of the last two decades. It has become the new economic mantra and 
will continue to exert influence on the lives of people in countries throughout the 
world for a long time to come”. Understanding what privatisation is, how it works, its 
prevalence, the ideas and doctrines which underlie the impact on the aviation industry 
and the impact on the security arrangements for this industry, is essential for 
politicians, government officials and their advisors and private organisations involved 
in aviation security. 
 
Up till the 1970s, it was considered normal for governments to get involved in all 
manner of economic and industrial activity. But the Thatcher-Reagan revolutions and 
the push to and early successes of privatisation changed all that (Gerald 2003). 
Aviation, with its history of government involvement was one of the most affected 
industries, with the killing of sacred cows like national flag-carrier airlines and 
showpiece airports (Harbison 2003).  The result was scores of airlines and airports 
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passing to private hands. This affected security, for the debate shifted as to whether the 
state should continue to guard privatised assets.  
 
Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) provide a comprehensive background to the long 
debate about government involvement and privatisation: “With the failures of 
capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s, and the initial successes of governments east and 
west, both in the New Deal and in Soviet central planning, and in the war, 
government seemed, after that war, the unequivocal solution to problems such as 
the unemployment the market had earlier permitted”. The inevitable result was 
more government involvement in all manner of activities from the Communist  
extremes in the Soviet Union and its followers in Cuba, East Europe, China and 
North Korea to the more middle-of-the-road strategic nationalization as in Britain 
and government-business-labour corporatism in Germany down to government 
regulation in the United States. When India gained independence from the British in 
1947, it triggered the dismantling of colonies everywhere and almost all the new 
nations saw central planning and state control as the only way to governance and 
development. Most failed. A third model appeared to have done much better - a mix 
of government intervention and market forces. Japan and its Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (and the successes of Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea) demonstrated 
that there could indeed be such a mix as Confucian Capitalism. 
 
Though the US was a bastion of the belief in private enterprise and market forces, it 
too went through a phase of government involvement before changing directions, as 
Yergin and Stanislaw point out: 
 28 
 “In the U.S. government regulation had become necessary, first to control the 
railroads in the late 19th century, and then in banking and other financial 
industries. But by the end of the 1960s, after innumerable new regulatory 
agencies had been created--several, ironically, by the Nixon administration--
many perceived free enterprise to be straitjacketed by regulation, and it was, just 
as ironically, Ted Kennedy who started the deregulatory trend in Congress with 
the airline industry.”  
 
It was Britain that, in realising that direct state control seemed to have shackled its 
industry altogether, started to get the government out of business, and became the 
model for the market reform that has been sweeping the world since then. Margaret 
Thatcher led her party with this ideology, and shortly thereafter the whole country 
(Gerald 2003).  
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union was the 
most spectacular demonstration of just how bad excessive state control is, in stifling 
initiative and innovation and dampening real economic growth. The events 
discredited the whole concept of state control and gave a booster to trends towards 
markets already underway. With denationalisation in Britain and deregulation in the 
U.S., their economies boomed, and countries everywhere were increasingly 
following suit (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). 
 
2.3.2   The stages of privatisation 
It would be useful to understand the process of privatisation in aviation security 
because of the unique challenges brought about by the involvement of governments 
and the use of aviation as a strategic target by terrorists. 
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Government policies in the area of the environment, national security, and their views 
of what aviation means to them, whether it is an essential service to the public, 
travellers and industry, and a source of employment for the local population and 
therefore worthy of receiving subsidies and government support and control or a 
purely commercial enterprise where conventional market forces should be left to 
dictate the scope, scale and nature of development, their attitude towards private 
participation and involvement in aviation, and the obligations of international 
agreements (Abeyratne 1998) have a major effect on the nature of aviation security 
regimes. 
 
Watson and Heeby (2002), wrote about a number of key questions to address 
government policy and aspirations that include: 
 “Are airports seen as a public utility? Is there a wish for airports to become more 
commercially viable? If there is a wish, then how should this be achieved 
through commercialisation and privatisation? Is there a need for the larger 
targeted airport to support smaller regional airports commercially? Where is the 
wish for construction, operation and commercialisation risk to be held? What are 
the legal, institutional and regulatory constraints of the above?  Is there a 
preference for a phased approach to commercialisation and privatisation?” 
 
These questions highlight the fact that there are many varieties of airport ownership, 
from total public control to totally private limited companies, all with advantages and 
disadvantages, such as the following risks associated with commercialisation and 
privatisation: extreme pursuit of profit damaging safety and service; change of airport 
use; abuse of dominant position; increased public/local community opposition; failure 
to invest; failure to diversify. 
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Weber (2001) wrote, “ Increasingly, governments prefer to focus on truly regulatory 
functions in aviation and to delegate operational functions to non-governmental 
entities. As a result, different forms of autonomous entities in charge of air traffic 
services and/or airports have been established, which may not directly form a part of 
governmental structures.” 
 
The four broad stages are as follows: 
 
State Control 
The state has total control of all aspects of aviation security, from policy to operations 
and recovers the costs through a variety of measures such as a tax on passengers, fees 
on airport users, a portion of airport revenue etc. Examples will include India, China 
and now the USA. This is the model used for what the Americans call “ inherently 
governmental functions” – where the state has to perform the function because it only 
has the right priorities and finances to make a success of it. 
 
Corporatisation 
The transformation of an existing state unit into, or the fresh establishment of, a legal 
and independent company wholly owned and controlled by the government or local 
authorities. Examples will include the Australian Protective Service (Donovan 1991), 
AVSECO of Hong Kong (Chow 2001) and Aviation Security Service of New Zealand 
(Civil Aviation Division of NZ Review 1987, Everitt 2002). Corporatisation is an 
attempt to introduce the rigours and philosophies of private industry while the 
government retains control and ownership of the organisation. 
 
 31 
As an example highlighted by Jane’s (2004) is the growing trend around the world 
towards taking airports and air navigation services out of direct government control.  
Canada established the privately owned, but not-for-profit, Nav Canada and 20 nations 
set up autonomous bodies owned by the governments, but run as independent 
businesses by various types of corporate structures expressly established for the task. 
Profits - and almost all are profitable - are either retained for future investment, or 
shared with the government owner, or returned to the user community as reduced user 
fees.  
 
 Jane’s (2004) also reported that a 2001 ICAO conference had highlighted the fact that 
in all current cases, the new organisations had brought about faster decision-making, 
increased operating efficiency, reduced excess staff and lowered operating costs. For 
example, in response to user requests, Nav Canada will install radar in Northern 
Quebec in less than two years from its go-ahead decision, compared to its Transport 
Canada predecessor’s seven years. Nav Canada’s operating costs have also been 
running 20% lower than Transport Canada’s, with commensurate reductions in user 
fees. 
 
Another term, used in Europe, is “public autonomous companies” – “public means that 
the main shareholder is the state, but autonomous means that it is separated from the 
Ministry of Transport and run like a limited public company with a board and a CEO.” 
(Esler 2004). The World Bank refers to such entities as State Holding Companies 




 These were all responses to the extreme privatisation pioneered in the UK and are well 
developed in Europe, even with what are traditionally seen as inherently governmental 
functions.  In France, PPPs are used in water and wastewater treatment plants, 
incinerators, district cooling, common services tunnels, stadiums and even prisons. Its 
impressive Stade de France, where the 1998 World Cup final was held, is a PPP that is 
profitable, primarily because of its multifaceted usage - soccer matches and athletic 
meets; exhibitions; conventions; tourist visits and a good French restaurant (Teo 2004). 
 
This ability to have multi-faceted use is critical for the aviation industry and its  
security forces. It is something that state agencies will have a problem with because of 
civil service mindsets of specialisation, special roles and service. On the other hand,  
private entities respond very rapidly to changing market and environmental forces and 
are better able to handle more diverse needs and demands so long as these are 
profitable. 
 
Teo feels that “deregulation and privatisation have proven not a panacea for the 
economic woes of scarcity and inefficient management of resources, thus 
strengthening the case for PPP as an alternative to outright privatisation”.  PPP appears 
to be a good alternative to outright privatisation by having an agreement or partnership 
that combines private initiative and services with the authorities' need to provide social 
goods and services and keep public assets in public hands. 
 
However, Teo emphasises the fact that this formula is not a guarantee and needs some  
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critical ingredients to succeed. It must not be a dumping ground for the State, pricing 
must be fair to both producers and consumers, monopolies are not abused, long-term 
financing and a financial system sound enough to ensure sustained financial viability, 
particularly in view of the high political and sovereign risks of most PPP operations in 
general and aviation in particular.  
 
The key in a PPP, as Teo points out, is the fact “that public service assets still belong  
to the state, thus countering any 'nationalistic' opposition; the state then sets the  
overall developmental strategy and regulatory framework for the private sector to  
Work within.” These success factors are even more imperative in aviation security,  




 This is one step further towards privatisation and is defined by Watson as the 
transformation of an airport organisation from a public utility to a commercial 
enterprise with the adoption of more business-like management philosophies, values 
and approaches. The drivers of commercialisation are dependent on investment 
expertise and resources not available or accessible to the public sector. Examples 
include Changi International Airport Services and SATS Security Services in 
Singapore and Manchester Airport in the UK. The major difference from the 
corporatisation phase is that ownership could be mostly in private hands with the state 




Moves towards commercialisation begin through a number of different inter-related 
developments – autonomy through independent airport authorities but state owned, 
profit orientation and self-financing through non-aviation or non-core activities such as 
training, services outside the airport, and a greater emphasis on financial rather than 
operational issues, and an increase in customer and client focus with improvements in 
services and facilities. 
 
Privatisation 
 This, Watson and Heeby (2002), define as the whole or part move from public to 
private ownership with the substantial involvement of private sector management and 
operation. Governments have sought to devolve responsibility for ownership of 
aviation security assets for reasons such as: reduced dependence on state resources; 
airport expansion to increase catchment/influence; inability to attract   finance/market 
investment; focus on customer requirements; focus on policy and regulations. 
 
Jane’s (2004) highlights the benefits of privatisation: governments cannot always 
release investment funds in the face of pressures from other national programmes 
deemed more essential whereas independent service providers are able to attract capital 
from the commercial money market; while still subject to government regulation, the 
new operating organisations are freed from political interference and arbitrary funding 
cuts by non-aviation-minded legislators and the organisation’s income is applied to the 
needs of its aviation customers, with no funds diverted to non-aviation projects. 
 
Esler (2004) quotes a US government source that one of the qualifiers employed to 
determine candidates for privatisation is the “Yellow Pages test”  - that is, any function 
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performed by a federal agency that simultaneously can be found in the business listings 
of the telephone directory is fair game, eg. grounds keeping, mail delivery and, of 
course, aviation security. 
 
2.3.3 The unique difference in aviation 
 
However, there is a difference in the case of aviation security. In most cases of 
corporatisation or commercialisation, these were seen as interim steps to eventual 
privatisation. However, even before September 11, as a result of the strategic 
importance to governments of the aviation sector and the increasing use of it as a target 
by terrorists, corporatisation was often seen as an end in itself – to get the best of both 
worlds – retaining state control but run as efficiently as a corporation as in the example 
of air traffic control services. 
 
The key performance indicators in the area of aviation security would be service  
 
levels, queue times, operating costs, and effective security as perceived by the  
 










                                          CHAPTER THREE   
                     FACTORS AFFECTING PRIVATISATION 
3.1 THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES IN AVIATION SECURITY 
3.1.1 Complex challenges 
In most strategic industries, the decision for state involvement, and issues of 
privatisation are fairly straightforward. A munitions plant, for instance, obviously 
needs high security and the state either insists on a minimum standard and monitors it 
closely or provides the guards and absorbs the cost or finds some way to recharge the 
facility if it is a private entity. The actual guarding is also a fairly simple “ castle and 
moat” model of concentric defence (Donovan 1991). 
 
In aviation, however, this has become more complex because of various developments 
and the perennial struggle between facilitation and security, pleasurable travel and 
painful searches (Elphinstone and Hancock, 2001). This is compounded by the choice 
by terrorist organisations of using aviation as a strategic target, from the hijackings of 
the 1960s and 1970s, to the suicide crashes of September 11. So, compared to other 
branches of security, aviation security had to evolve into a distinct profession of its 
own that has further complicated the debate about whether it is best done by private or 
state organisations. 
 
The core requirement for Aviation Security continues to be the prevention of criminal 
acts against aircraft which, in their purest sense, are best handled by the state but 
various, often contradictory, trends and developments over the years have expanded its 
functions so that a lot of what is done by aviation security forces is often most 
 37 
efficiently delivered by private agencies. The state model helps tackle the larger issues 
but is not a good model to tackle operational and service issues (Teo 2004). 
 
3.1.2   Trends 
A major trend is the emphasis on the development of large airports into mini-cities, or 
an Airtropolis, as Changi Airport once called itself, and the concentration of people 
and material in one relatively small space vulnerable to an attack. Airports are now 
characterised by massive and quick flows, legal and illegal, of aircraft, passengers and 
cargo and these lead to difficulties in monitoring movements and the ease of escape 
and non-detection. 
 
There is intense competition to be centres of pleasure and leisure with dependence on 
both travellers and visitors. On the one hand, the presence of aviation security officers 
as part of the airport team demands that they are partners in the delivery of the fast and 
pleasurable experience that airports are now striving to deliver, something that state 
personnel often have a problem with, and on the other hand, the need for continued 
vigilance (Bernard 2001). 
 
Large concentrations of airport workers of various nationalities, both legal and illegal, 
recruited for the many low-skilled and low paying jobs in airports and the highly 
skilled aviation professions, bring with them the political and cultural baggage of their 
home countries and can be caught in situations where there is a conflict between their 
religion or ethnicity and the interests of the airport (Savage 2002). This also poses 
constraints on employment in aviation security organisations, particularly if they are 
state owned, further complicating the issue of adequate manning levels. 
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National economies are becoming more dependent on airports and related activities 
and hence more vulnerable to disruption through attacks on aviation and the 
devastation to trade and tourism (Aaronson 2003) 
 
Free trade emphasis means minimum checks on passengers and cargo, particularly 
those in transit, leading to more crime through illegal shipments of humans, 
contraband, drugs and arms. Elphinstone and Hancock (2001) highlight another 
concern in this regard: “…Countries seldom previously thought of as tourist 
destinations are now opening their doors. Strict visa regulations, once an important 
security protection “device” both for national security and more particularly for 
aviation security, have now been relaxed as countries scramble for their share of the 
tourism market”.  
 
Airports have become major international hubs and conduits for drugs, illegal 
immigration, contraband and terrorism. Trying to curb these may end up with curbs on 
facilitation and service. Aviation assets continue to be and are becoming more 
attractive targets for publicity-hungry groups or for those seeking to disrupt a country’s 
economy. 
 
The privatisation of airports and the greater commercial pressures mean that security 
forces are often appointed by, paid for or are associated with the private owners. This 
means that security forces can be caught in the conflict between the interests of the 
State and their paymasters, the duties of law enforcement and the expectation by 
passengers for more flexibility and niceties from a private force where previously they 
were prepared to accept sternness from the authorities.  
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Added to this is what Elphinstone and Hancock (2001) highlighted as a consequence of 
privatisation: “The opening up of landside precincts to the widest range of commercial 
and recreational opportunities is an obvious corollary to airport 
privatisation…determining risk and policing that risk takes on a totally new 
perspective.” 
 
Airlines and other aviation organisations will continue to be in the conflict between the 
need for security and the ability to pay. 
 
3.1.3   Security design 
Whatever the trends, airports, by their very nature, have only one aim in mind - 
facilitation - the rapid movement of people and materials in a smooth manner. 
However, the various different trends have meant that facilitation must be balanced by 
security and economics. The nature of security designs has a direct impact on the kind 
of aviation security regime needed and the relationship between public and private 
entities. 
 
Many airports - designed and built in pre-hijack days - are now grappling with 
redesign for security needs. So it has been now recognised that it is essential that for all 
new airport development and redevelopment projects, security must be a design factor 
from the outset. Security professionals now have representation at every stage and 
have to take a holistic and pre-emptive view.  
 
The tendency so far has been reactive. For instance, the first reaction to the Cuban and 
Palestinian hijackings was generally limited to the screening of bags at check-in and 
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the screening of passengers at the boarding gates through metal detectors and physical 
searches. In many airports but particularly in American ones, the rest of the terminal 
allowed free movement of travellers and visitors for the sake of the shops and other 
outlets. And there was little pre-employment screening of airport workers, until after 
9/11 (Fitzgerald 2001). 
 
The need to balance between facilitation and security, the complex trends in airport 
development and the multiple levels of vulnerability, demanded comprehensive 
solutions that again have considerable impact on the structure and profile of aviation 
security organisations. In all cases, the best approach is a Layered Approach or 
sometimes referred to as Defence in Depth or a Concentric Circle Concept. Aviation 
Security covers a vast range, from exterior airport areas and terminal interiors to 
aircraft cabins, flight decks and cargo holds, all demanding their own circles or layers 
of defence. It will encompass a combination of good procedures enforced rigorously, 
technical systems and equipment, a well trained workforce, effective control and 
command, constant monitoring of trends, frequent risks reviews and planned facility 
surveys (Cooper 1991). 
 
This approach involves the following measures: 
Protecting the periphery or the outer circle: The earlier or further away the intervention 
or interception or prevention, the better it is. These should take place well before a 
security threat can reach its intended target and will involve: 
Hardware: This will involve measures to secure the public areas and controlling 
movements and access roads, parking areas and other exterior spaces, through 
personnel and video based surveillance that keep an eye on activity in these areas as 
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well as less visible locations. Asset locaters can wirelessly track the location of tagged 
objects and security personnel in real time, helping to identify deviations from the 
norm that may indicate a threat or risk to a facility. Blast-shield products can protect 
structures. 
The next step is the securing of peripheral buildings such as maintenance hangars, 
loading docks and storage yards with the same methods as outlined above and finally 
securing entrances to the passenger terminal. 
Software: This will include screening of visitors and employees, access control to and 
within critical areas according to need and through a pass or biometric system or a 
combination, with Smart cards that deter tampering and duplication and a variety of 
authentication technologies such as finger-print, hand geometry, voice recognition, iris 
scanning and facial recognition. There must be coordination between agencies and 
sharing of information and pre-flight profiling of passengers, cargo and mail. 
 
Securing the inner circle: This involves securing the airfield through adequate 
perimeter protection, warning fences, lighting, a patrol system, peripheral inspection, a 
response system to react to intrusions, controlled inspection at exits and entrances to 
airfields. 
There is also the establishment of a gauntlet of blocks and delays to limit or obstruct 
access to aprons, taxiways and runways or intercept escaping vehicles and block 
escape routes. 
Securing the core: This step covers the screening and profiling of passengers, cargo, 
and mail and operating personnel (catering, cleaning, maintenance) entering, departing 
aircraft through screening by trained personnel and technical equipment such as x-ray 
and cat-scan machines. 
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Then there is the task of securing arriving aircraft from the time they land to complete 
disembarkation, video and biometric monitoring of suspected passengers, baggage 
match procedures (that is - no aircraft to take off if the passenger is not on board with 
his baggage), Aircraft hardening involving hardened shells, reinforced cockpit doors, 
and blast resistant cargo containers, video surveillance of cabin and holds, controlled 
protection of the terminal building against car bombs, and screening at entrances to 
terminals for all employees, visitors and travellers. 
 
The final defence line: All employees must get security awareness training, unarmed 
combat training, rewards for action, and a reorientation of doctrine and mindsets to 




3.1.4   The role of Aviation Security Management 
All this means profound implications for those managing aviation security. They are 
expected to be not only experts in security, but also the full range of functions that are 
now expected of an aviation security force. They have to look at a number of issues. 
 
Extensive training and development systems: Training is really the only solution to 
reconciling the contradictory demands of security and service and to meeting the 
multi-faceted demands of cross-cultural awareness, complex machines and 
complicated procedures (MacKenzie 1996, Everitt 2002, Anderson 2003, Marie 2004). 
And training in the security industry is more than training. It is service development, 
product development, and performance improvement.  The product is the security 
officer. It is his or her health, alertness and knowledge that determines service and 
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performance levels. Aviation Security Officers have to realise they have to be 
passenger services officers as well.  This impacts on selection and training.  
Considerable investments have to be made in the selection of customer-oriented 
candidates and in customer services and cross-cultural training (Singh 2002).  The 
traditional practice of recruiting from the police and armed forces may no longer be 
sufficient or even suitable.  The industry must ask itself which is better:  recruit 
military types and give them customer service training or recruit customer services 
types and give them security training. 
 
Sophisticated rostering arrangements: Airports have the most unpredictable patterns of 
movement - the need for 24-hour operation, the unusual hours for arrivals and 
departures, the consistent disruptions to schedule because of weather, technical 
problems and all kinds of incidents.  It is therefore necessary, firstly to evolve very 
flexible working patterns like split shifts, staggered reporting times and flexi-time, and 
secondly, to develop very sophisticated rostering patterns to maximise the manpower 
available.  This is often difficult to do with state agencies with their protected careers, 
strong unions and traditional resistance to change (Donovan 1994). 
 
Integration and co-ordination mechanisms: Aviation security is a borderless challenge, 
so it is necessary for managers to develop worldwide networks and channels.  It is also 
borderless within an airport, with overlaps between different law enforcement 
agencies. This makes it necessary to have co-ordination mechanisms that take care of 
both intra-airport and cross-border issues. This will involve intra-airport issues such as 
establishing a single authority for AVSEC in an airport with the necessary clout to 
coordinate, integrate and enforce, having regular coordinating meetings, conducting 
audits on all agencies, conducting joint crime and security awareness activities. It will 
 44 
also involve international issues: Exchanging intelligence information, attending 
overseas conferences and meetings, membership of international police/security 
organisations like the International Association of Aviation Security Officers and the 
International Association of Airport and Seaport Police. While this is easy for a state 
police force to do this at inter-governmental level, they are often constrained by the 
political quarrels of their masters. Private agencies have more latitude in this regard. 
 
Cultivation of a Commercial mindset: The privatisation process and the emphasis on 
service means that aviation security forces must adapt their police or military mindsets 
to service industry expectations of performance, response and rates (Donovan 1994). It 
means the establishment of mechanisms to deal with service recovery, charges and 
negotiations. 
 
Procedural Reviews: There has to be frequent reviews of procedures that balance the 
need for security against the demand for speed and pleasure.  There will be pressure to 
choose those that cause least inconvenience, are unobtrusive and almost unseen. An 
example is the centralised screening now being developed and tried out in some 
airports, that allow for screening of passenger baggage without inconvenience to the 
large majority. 
 
3.1.5   The role of state and airport authorities 
The State or its appointed authority must retain overall control, co-ordinate all 
agencies, and have minimum standards. It must empower aviation security forces with 
adequate legal clout.  This means proper directives. In Singapore, for instance, aviation 
security officers are auxiliary police forces, with all the powers of police within the 
airport area but they cannot detain or retain passengers unless there is state sanction 
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through orders from the Immigration Authority who are empowered through adequate 
legislation. 
 
The state must ensure that security needs are considered at the outset for new airports 
and redevelopment plans, and thereafter by having security representatives in all 
planning activities. 
 
3.1.6   The roles of Aviation Security Officers 
One can see that, as a result of all these developments and the complex nature of 
aviation security, a typical Aviation Security Officer can be expected to be all or some 
of the following: 
Legal Officer: They have to understand both local law and all the international 
legislation that relates to aviation security like ICAO Annex 17, the Chicago 
Convention, etc.  
Passenger Services Officer: security Officers are often the first points of contact for 
travellers and are expected to ensure that a traveller’s journey is pleasant.  This poses 
extraordinary demands on service levels and the consequent demands on training, 
rewards and recruitment. State agencies and Police forces are generally uncomfortable 
with these roles as they feel they are only accountable to the state and not to any 
commercial organisation or to the public. 
Airport Operations Officer: Security is often so integrated with the operations of the 
airport that security officers have to understand airport operations, manage some of the 
processes and cope with some of the unique challenges like unpredictable patterns and 
round-the-clock-operations. 
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Geography expert: The wide range of cultures and nationalities that move through an 
airport results in many cross-cultural issues, requiring airport personnel, but 
particularly aviation security personnel, to manage diversity well. 
Travel Document Expert: The fines that airports imposed on airlines for carrying 
improperly documented passengers has spawned a huge demand for travel document 
expertise.  Invariably, the security or police forces in place are in the best position to 
respond to provide this service or are expected to do so. 
X-Ray Machine Operator: It takes four years for a radiographer to be trained to 
interpret x-ray images. Yet aviation security officers operating x-ray detection 
machines have to make equally complex interpretations after three days of training. 
Cargo Handler: Airports are vast hubs for all kinds of valuables – currency notes, 
precious metals and stones, IC chips, and artwork.  The onus of ensuring the security 
of these shipments invariably falls upon the aviation security force – from receiving 
and escorting to guarding and storage. It means a need for such a force to understand 
the procedures involved or even handle such cargo, manage vaults and investigate.  
Prison Wardens:  The vast movements of illegal migrants have often resulted in  
detention of such travellers at airports. Again, the onus to escort, guard and sometimes  
detain them has fallen on the aviation security force, bringing with it a need to       
understand and implement complex detention procedures and cells. 
 
3.1.7   The roles of international regulatory organisations 
There are a number of international organisations or bodies who have a stake in 
determining and standardising aviation security “best practice”. In order to understand 
the impact on the local structure of aviation security arrangements, it would be 
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important to have an understanding of international organisations that oversee the 
borderless challenge of aviation security.  
 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO): ICAO, as part of the United 
Nations is the only inter-governmental and hence the major international body 
involved in the worldwide coordination of aviation security. It was established at the 
most important convention to regulate air travel, the Convention on International 
Aviation - to become known by the shortened title of the Chicago Convention of 1944 
- and began operations in 1947.  
 
ICAO is dedicated to developing safe and efficient international air transport for 
peaceful purposes and ensuring a reasonable opportunity for every State to operate 
international airlines. Its activities include, in part, the establishment and review of 
international standards for the licensing of personnel, aircraft operation, condition of 
aircraft, telecommunications, meteorology, rules of the air, facilitation, and aviation 
security. A total of 185 or almost all of the world’s nations are now signatories to a 
range of international civil aviation “Conventions”. 
 
 ICAO’s establishment goes back to World War two, with its increase in military air 
traffic and the emergence of commercial airlines. The newly established United 
Nations decided to seek international agreement on managing commercial aviation and 
formed ICAO as one of many organisations having special authority to regulate special 
interest areas affecting world affairs. ICAO’s task then was to lobby all sovereign 
States in an attempt to gain support for an international aviation charter of rights and 
responsibilities. This resulted in the Chicago Convention that contained a 
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comprehensive portfolio of standards, documents, protocols and procedures that 
related to every aspect of commercial aviation. It was designed to guide nations in 
developing their own (internal) regulations while adhering to international uniformity. 
It included agreements on air navigation procedures, rules of the air corridors, air 
traffic control, air search and rescue, aeronautical information services, the regulating 
of airport configurations and design, environmental protection, the transport of 
dangerous goods, communications, surveillance, dissemination of meteorological 
information, the airworthiness of aircraft and eventually security.  
 
Attached to these documents are a number of annexures or annexes and Annex 17 is 
the security annexure. Titled “Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts 
of Unlawful Interference”, all signatories to ICAO eventually agreed to Annex 17. It 
has become the now familiar international standards, protocols and procedures for all 
aspects of aircraft, airline and airport security. Its focus at that time was to combat 
increasing threats to air travel from hijacks and, later, terrorism. Over time, Annex 17 
has been amended and up-dated to reflect contemporary risks and threats, the latest 
being the impact of September 11. 
 
ICAO’s stakeholder interests obviously originate with the mandate of the United 
Nations whose charter bestows on it the right to become involved in a wide range of 
world affairs and interests - especially in the setting and monitoring of standards and 




While ICAO has come under occasional criticisms, its role has been generally 
welcomed and accepted. However, its legitimacy as a primary stakeholder in the 
management of aviation security still leaves it without authority when a sovereign 
State chooses not to implement or adequately police its Conventions. While Annex 17 
details aviation security standards, it does not determine or dictate how these are to be 
implemented and this is left entirely to each signatory to decide. This limitation of 
enforceability is, of course, not unique to aviation security but the same as that applied 
to other areas of the UN’s role.  
 
Each government must, under the terms of Annex 17, set up its own national security 
programs/strategies designed to complement the requirements of ICAO. In addition to 
the Chicago Convention, ICAO also administers   international aviation security issues 
through several other international conventions relating to unlawful acts on or against 













Table 2: ICAO Aviation Conventions. 
 
1963 Tokyo Convention - 
• obliges States to extend their criminal law and jurisdiction to 
aircraft of their registry when they are outside national territory; 
• gives the pilot-in-command power to ensure law and order on 
board his/her aircraft and to disembark any offender in any 
contracting State in which the aircraft lands; 
• obliges States to take all appropriate measures to restore control of 
an aircraft hijacked in flight to the pilot-in-command; and 
• obliges the State in which the aircraft lands to allow the passengers 
and crew to continue their journey, and to return the aircraft and its 
cargo to those lawfully entitled to possession. 
1970 Hague Convention - 
• this convention was concluded in an effort to prevent hijackers 
from finding immunity in any of the contracting States. 
1971 Montreal Convention and the 1988 Montreal Protocol - 
• this convention and protocol expands upon the unlawful acts not 
covered in the 1970 Hague Convention, such as: 
  • destruction of aircraft; 
• violence against a person on board an aircraft; 
• placement of devices or substances likely to destroy an 
aircraft; 
• destruction or damage of air navigation facilities thus 
endangering an aircraft in flight; 
• communication of false information endangering the safety of 
an aircraft in flight; and 
• requires the establishment of offence provisions within States 
jurisdictions. 
 





Other international Organisations: There are a number of other worldwide or regional  
 




IATA: The largest of these is the International Air Transport Association (IATA) .Its 
Articles were drafted at the Chicago Convention of 1944 and it was established in 
1945 in Canada. It has a membership of over 200 airlines accounting for around 95% 
of world passenger traffic. 
IATA helps its members by liasing with ICAO, governments and other bodies on 
issues that affect its members such as those on safety and security. It has an aviation 
security committee. A major achievement has been the development of training 
programmes on aviation security. It has now joined forces with ICAO and Airports 
Council International (ACI) to organise an annual aviation security conference and 
more comprehensive training programmes for the entire aviation industry. 
National Bodies with international impact: The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) of the USA is unique in that, while it is the government regulator for the United 
States, its brief enables it to require international carriers and airport owners/operators 
to meet certain FAA security standards in the development of reciprocal carrier rights 
to and from the US. These standards may vary from those contained in Annex 17, or 
they may be additional requirements. 
The European Civil Aviation Committee (ECAC) imposes additional security 
requirements under the same rationale of the FAA. European airports that “subscribe” 
to ECAC control require foreign carriers to meet certain standards to complement 
those contained in Annex 17. 
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Airports Council International: The Airports Council International (ACI) performs a 
coordinating function similar   to IATA , but for the airport operators and owners. It 
has its own aviation security committee. 
Regional Associations: Most regions or major nations   have regional airline or airport 
associations doing similar functions to IATA or ACI but at a regional or national level. 
The US has an Air Transport Association for its carriers and this has considerable 
lobbying powers. 
Freight Associations: There are international, regional and national freight 
associations that coordinate the activities of freight forwarders and related units in the 
air freight industry. 
Industry Associations: There are a number of associations that help bring together 
aviation security professionals and organisations to share information and coordinate 
activities. These include the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police, 
International Association of Chiefs of Police and International Society for Crime 
Prevention Practitioners. These help bring cross-functional perspectives and share the 
security lessons from other sectors. 
 
The significance of all these organisations is that aviation security is such an 
international, cross-border challenge that any national regime must have state 
involvement to take care of ICAO obligations and other cross-border issues and yet 
have private sector involvement in and connections to the various private initiatives in 






3.2 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO AVIATION SECURITY  
 
A major impact on the nature of aviation security organizations is the different 
approaches and principles to costing or establishing an aviation security regime. Some 
of the principles are: 
 
3.2.1   Essential ingredients of an aviation security system 
In deciding on the structure of an aviation system   that will ensure a high level of 
security, we have to consider the essential ingredients of an aviation security system: 
regulations and powers, standards, staff matters (quality, selection, training, incentive 
and motivation, control and corrective action) and monitoring as set out in the NZ 
CAD review of 1986: 
Regulations and Powers: These are contained in the various acts for each country. 
Powers of detention and arrest are essential, even though the usual practice is to detain 
suspects and hand them over to the police for formal arrest. Usually, private security 
forces do not attach much significance to the power of arrest since police are usually at 
hand. In most cases, aviation security forces are given limited powers or, as in the case 
of Singapore, comprehensive police powers as Auxiliary Police Officers but restricted 
to the airport.  
Standards: Most airports and police agencies maintain comprehensive statistics that 
could be a base for establishing standards. In New Zealand, for instance, Auckland 
accounted for 76% of the total international passengers screened and 80% of the total 
items seized. Wellington had a similar detection rate. Christchurch had a higher rate. It 
would seem a good correlation exists between passengers screened and items seized 
thus indicating that standards could be set, such as seizure rates per 10 000 screenings 
or passing “dummy” bags containing prohibited items and noting the detection rate. 
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Staffing: The selection process determines the quality of staff and their enthusiasm and 
morale maintained through training, motivation and supervision. The performance of 
the security forces reflects on the leadership and the attention paid to management 
aspects of the job. But good security management is not confined to the state security 
units. With time and dedication, there is no reason why similar levels of performance 
cannot be achieved by private forces. 
Monitoring: The purpose of monitoring is to check that standards are being achieved 
and, if not, to take corrective action. If an airline or airport does not meet the 
regulations then the state has the authority to withdraw the license. In practice, 
however, it is difficult to imagine withdrawal of the license of a major airline or airport 
or security force. Graduated penalties are more realistic incentives than draconian 
threats of total loss of license. The effectiveness of passenger screening could be 
monitored by secretly passing test items through the screening check. Such a 
monitoring system would need to have standards that are achievable, reasonable and, 
ideally, be agreed between the parties. The standard should be tested against previous 
systems and staffing, thereby establishing its attainability. It should also have 
objectivity. There should be a specified list of unacceptable items, some of which 
would fall within the “must find” category. There should be a scale of fines sufficiently 
large to be effective but graduated to avoid unduly harsh penalties for minor 
transgressions.  
 
3.2.2   Separation of regulatory and operational functions 
A basic philosophy that drove the privatisation or corporatisation process is that the 
state through its aviation security authority should set standards and monitor their 
adherence, but should not itself carry out operational functions. To be an operator 
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means that the authority monitors itself, and the independence necessary for impartial 
monitoring is at risk (Civil Aviation Review NZ 1986). 
 
The role of the aviation security authority is then redefined as a regulatory body, 
setting standards and monitoring their accomplishment. Laws and regulations must 
then contain significant financial penalties if standards are not met. 
 
Given proper training, supervision and monitoring, there is therefore no compelling 
reason why a private force cannot match the existing level of performance by a state 
agency, even during the transitional phase to a private entity. The monitoring role of 
the aviation security authority would be enhanced through a greater degree of 
objectivity resulting from its independence from daily operational tasks. 
 
3.2.3   Efficiency of operations 
Even in countries where the state aviation security organizations were doing well, such 
as in New Zealand and Australia, there were still reviews on the efficiency gains of 
corporatisation or privatisation. In its 1986 review, the NZ Civil Aviation Department 
(NZCAD) noted that:  
 “The question is not whether, under the present organizational arrangement, 
aviation security is being successfully and efficiently accomplished; that is 
beyond doubt. The question is whether fewer resources would be required by 
aviation security if it had a different organizational arrangement. Our terms of 
reference require us to see whether CAD safety functions can be achieved with 
fewer resources, and to consider the implications of ‘user pays’”. 
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The result of the review was the separation of regulatory and operational functions, 
previously all with the Aviation Security Section of the Civil Aviation Department. 
The NZ CAD retained the regulatory functions while the operations were transferred to 
a new, state-owned but independent, corporatised agency called the NZ Aviation 
Security Service. 
 
3.2.4   Integration with other airport agencies 
When airports were privatised, one of the common arguments in transferring security 
functions from specialist state agencies to the airport company was the efficiencies 
from the integration of functions. 
 
Some airports, like the Port of New York, integrate their police with fire and rescue 
services, resulting in considerable savings and high esteem and motivation in the 
workforce. It allows an amalgamation of various airport activities and the 
maximization of resources and takes account of peaks in operations with fewer 
resources being required overall. 
 
Because of the varied patterns of aircraft movements, aviation security and other 
airport functions such as rescue services, place particularly irregular demands on 
personnel resources. Airports can weave a number of duties and, to some extent, even-
out the workload for security personnel. 
 
Offsetting this gain is a possible loss of safety if the effectiveness of security staff 
takes a dip at the time of transfer to the airport companies, and lasts for as long as it 
takes new management and staff to learn the ropes. However, with proper planning and 
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preparation, existing security levels can be maintained and even improved in the long 
term. 
 
3.2.5   Labour regulations and dispute resolution 
One of the fears in the privatisation process is whether privatised organizations can 
handle security in the same way that state agencies have done. A complicating factor 
has been the experience in some airports, such as in New Zealand, where a transfer of 
ownership to private hands and the consequent transfer of responsibility for crash fire 
services, resulted in subsequent industrial problems between crash fire staff and their 
employers. So it is essential that the aviation security force be classified as an essential 
service with limits to disruptive industrial disputes (Donovan 1991). This same 
concern was recognised by the Australians and they made sure that the APS employees 
were not part of the police or civil service unions. 
 
On the other hand, the drawback of state agencies is the protection of careers and the 
limits to hiring and firing decisions by the aviation security organization. So it is 
important to seek a balance. Singapore, for instance, appoints Auxiliary Police Officers 
who are not allowed to be unionised or to strike but do not have the protected careers 
of State Police Officers. The US Transportation Security Administration officers are 
considered Federal employees and there would probably be long term issues of hiring, 
firing, demotion etc. 
 
3.2.6   Aviation Security as a Contestable Task 
It has often been argued that the aviation security operations at airports should be 
contestable; in other words, that security tasks should be put out to tender, including 
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purely security companies operating outside the airport. The example of fire and rescue 
services in a number of airports is used in support of this and, until September 11, was 
the standard approach at all US airports. 
 
The major benefit of competition is lower rates for clients such as passengers and the 
airlines that result from competitive pressures, faster decision making, increased 
operating efficiency, reduced excess staff and lowered operating costs. The objections 
against this are that tendering for security checking could result in regular and needless 
dips in safety level at each changeover of operator, the tendency to go for the lowest 
tender and hence trigger the inevitable spiral in quality, which was the constant refrain 
amongst critics of the American approach. 
 
3.2.7    Allowing outside security companies to tender 
A corollary debate to the need for competition is the question whether to allow outside 
(the airport) companies to tender. The NZ Review received the following arguments 
for and against and which apply at most airports. 
 
     “Airport authorities, companies and owners have shown how better utilization of 
on-airport staff can yield efficiencies. However the fact that outside security firms 
do not enjoy the natural advantages of airport companies is not good enough reason 
to deny outside firms the opportunity to tender. While airport organisations would 
have a more direct vested interest and long-term commitment than an outside 
security company seeking early profits, a specialist security firm may bring a 
broader experience to bear and, with it, new approaches and technology. This was 
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the argument the US used to set up an exclusive security organisation to replace the 
security arm of the FAA. 
 
      Worldwide, outside contracts for personal baggage security surveillance are not 
noted for high performance levels and detection rates. However there are also 
worldwide statistics showing the poor performance of airport units. What is 
important is having the right system of maintaining standards. For the regulatory 
body, the process would be the same for airport or outside companies. The failure 
of the FAA was in not enforcing consistent standards. 
 
     Tendering for security checking could result in regular and needless dips in safety 
level at each changeover of operator. For the benefits of the tendering process to be 
worthwhile, these need to exceed the cost of the added risk at each changeover. 
Because airport companies enjoy a natural advantage, even if security firms could 
under price airport companies, it seems unlikely that security companies could 
have sufficient margin of advantage to offset the risks of intermittent changeovers. 
This appears a valid argument but is not enough grounds to exclude these outside 
firms on the basis of a principle .It is just a disadvantage they have to overcome. A 
federal security body overcomes this disadvantage. 
 
      Unless aviation security is in airport hands, trade-offs cannot be made between 
alternative means of achieving security objectives that involve airport investment. 
The number of staff required may depend on the level of airport investment in 
security devices (e.g. remote television monitors) and the effectiveness of security 
fences and gates. Unless the airport is responsible for aviation security, these 
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investment versus staff trade-offs are unlikely to be made. This is true and is often 
the main argument used to integrate aviation security functions with those of the 
airport or to have exclusive aviation security organizations.” 
 
3.2.8 Keeping aviation security to State agencies 
 
Many arguments are used by those who feel that aviation security should be entirely in 
state and national hands. These were gleaned from the NZ review and discussions with 
State aviation security officials from different countries. 
 
Security and policing by the state for the safety and security of aircraft, passengers, 
crews, airport visitors, employees and all aviation assets are highly specialized 
functions regardless of the industry. The fact that these activities take place on airports 
does not give the airport owners the right to assume they can do these functions.  
 
The goals of a country’s national aviation security programme directly relate to their 
Government’s obligations under international agreements and the need to protect the 
national investment in and reliance upon aviation. So there are cross-border and 
international implications that can only be done by the state and these have an impact 
on the effectiveness of the national aviation security programme. While private 
companies or local organizations contribute to the national programme, their aims, 
strategies and responsibilities are locally and commercially orientated. 
 
 The threat or risk to be secured against is of a national nature as assessed by 
governments based upon their intelligence advisers. Counter measures should also be a 
national nature and not left to the whims and priorities of private organizations. A 
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national system provided to protect against a national threat situation enables a 
national cost structure. This ensures that individual airports with smaller passenger 
numbers are not at a cost disadvantage over busier competing airports. The reverse 
may also true: an airport with a smaller passenger throughput may be forced to absorb 
the security costs of larger airports with higher security risks. Ideally, costs should be 
borne where they arise but in aviation security, the entire security is only as strong as 
the weakest link. 
 
A national system encourages consistency of procedures, practices and performance 
dependent upon the perceived national threat. Localized systems inevitably reflect the 
viability, priorities and whims of individual airports and their management, making 
nationally coordinated consistent counter measures difficult if not impossible to 
achieve, particularly when immediate action is required. This was the repeated failing 
of the US FAA. 
 
Staff carrying out the discharge of their Government’s responsibilities to security of 
aviation and contributing to the security of adjoining States through the programme 
should be responsible to the Government, and have the powers and authority to 
discharge their own tasks and ensure that others involved discharge theirs.  
 
             It is vitally important that security staff managing and carrying out front line 
duties have access to all relevant intelligence to ensure the level of security effort 
matches the threat at any given point in time and can be quickly upgraded or 
downgraded to meet changes in the threat. This also considerably assists job interest 
and motivation when staff are able to be fully informed of relevant intelligence which 
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gives rise to changes. Sensitive intelligence detail cannot be made available to private 
organizations. 
 
           The nature of security activities, particularly in the area of passenger screening, 
requires a continuous high level of motivation, skill and judgement of an instant 
nature. Failures rarely show up until a serious incident occurs. This makes the use of 
delegated tasks, with an indirect inspectorate to ensure standards, quite impractical 
unless constant costly supervision is maintained requiring a substantial group of 
inspectors. (The recent experience in Canada and the United States confirms this.) 
 
The division of prime aviation security tasks and responsibilities between 
organizations is undesirable. It inevitably leads to turf battles, to splintering of security 
operations as each organization circumscribes as tightly as possible the limits of their 
own involvement rather than addressing security needs as a whole. This is a major 
problem in many countries, particularly the larger ones with complex ownership 
issues, different governance levels at county, state etc.  
 
Many tasks carried out by staff on security duties are individually mundane and 
repetitive. Unless a number and variety of complementary tasks are available, with 
duty staff being frequently rotated, motivation is impossible to maintain. This is one of 
the main criticisms of the US tender process and one of the main arguments by New 
Zealand at having a single Aviation Security agency looking after the entire and hence 
varied range of all aviation security functions. Their HR Manual states: 
 63 
“Every effort should be made to make the scope of the aviation security officer’s 
work as wide as possible.  Their duties could include, in addition to screening, 
aircraft and terminal search, guard and access control, foot and mobile patrols 
and any other suitable duties.  The rotation of persons between several duties is a 
strong motivating factor for the following reasons: 
(a) It improves alertness by changing the outlook. 
(b) It improves job satisfaction by introducing additional skills. 
(c) It provides staff with a better overall view of security and where they fit into 
the system. 
(d) It improves the well being of staff through changes in the working 
environment. 
(e) It provides staff with a better self-image, resulting in better performance and             
greater respect from the public.” 
 
 
All these arguments are valid but do not necessarily mean that the solution must be a 
single state agency. The issue can be addressed by the establishment of a single 
sufficiently empowered committee or agency at national or federal levels, proper 
separation of functions, delegation to an approved organization with designated 
persons having delegated authorities, proper background checks and security 
clearance, effective control and coordinating mechanisms, the right kind of regulations 
and standards set by the state and effective performance monitoring methods. The 
international coordination can continue at state levels. Transfer to private forces does 
not necessarily mean that there is no longer supervision and one cannot assume that 
private forces will be lacking in motivation, be unsupervised or untrained.       
  
3.2.9   State Security: Federalized or decentralized? 
Even when the decision is for the State to look after all aspects of Aviation Security, 
there is an on-going debate as to whether to have one national agency or to 
decentralize to the counties or airports. The debate extends to police and security 
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regimes and in the absence of similar studies in the security area, it would be useful to 
look at studies of police.  
 
 Kurtz (2003) stated, “the question of centralized versus decentralized police 
organization is perhaps the most important police decision facing the nations of the 
world. On the one hand, centralization is viewed as a danger to personal freedom; on 
the other, decentralization is viewed as fragmented and inefficient”. Centralized Police 
Services have the advantage of standardized service and delivery, reduces 
administrative duplication, provides higher levels of training, allows coordination of 
efforts to stop (cross boundary) serial killers, drug dealers, nationwide gangs, traffic 
offences that cross jurisdictions and repeat offenders, reduces local corruption, reduces 
local political interference, provides national coordination of computerized record 
keeping, provides coordination of counter terrorism measures and reduces costs. 
Decentralized Police Services provide more flexibility in the service and its delivery, 
more local control, special training for local needs, customizes enforcement strategies, 
reduces national corruption, reduces national interference, protects against “big 
brother”, focuses on local crime and reduces costs. 
 
The United States always had a decentralized system. Kurtz (2003) cites an opinion by 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 1977 that 
historically, the United States of America has distrusted centralized authority, and 
there is no national police force: “Even at the local level, policing is fragmented among 
neighbouring jurisdictions and municipal versus county police. These local 
departments employ 80 percent of all police officers, with the remainder allocated to 
state, county, and national agencies”. 
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This must have weighed heavily on the minds of those who pushed for a Federal 
Department to oversee aviation security and counter terrorism measures. There was a 
pressing need for Federal coordination with law enforcement powers that the FAA 
could not provide and one cannot conceive of a privatized national organization doing 
this. Because of the traditional resistance to Federal bodies, September 11 gave the 
Federal government the opportunity to push this through with bi-partisan support. 
 
3.2.10   The case for privatised forces 
Those who argue for privatised forces cite the fact that responsibility and control 
through monitoring and enforcement would still lie with the state. A transfer of 
operational tasks to the airports will not automatically result in a deterioration of 
service. Airports could offer a wider range of tasks than is possible with a stand-alone 
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                                          CHAPTER FOUR 
                      SPECIFIC COUNTRY STUDIES 
 
4.1       MODELS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPACT 
4.1.1   USA: A perpetual drift 
The great irony in the history of aviation security in the US is that all the post-
September 11 recommendations have been recommended before. It appears a 
characteristic feature of the US to drift after an initial outpouring of enthusiasm. It is 
important to understand this feature of US politics so that one can see why the decision 
to privatise or not is often determined by reasons other than logic. 
 
Steve Forbes, Editor–in-chief of Forbes Global magazine, said in an editorial in the 22 
July 2002 issue, of the intransigence inherent in the American political system:  
 “No wonder Americans feel that the war on terrorism is drifting, that the 
energetic resolve following Sept 11 is dissipating. Effective detection equipment 
that can screen cargo containers remains unused; “lethal” nail clippers are often 
energetically seized, while our hapless transportation chief forbids the type of 
profiling that the no-nonsense Israelis have employed for years. Those 
responsible for the intelligence debacle of Sept 11 remain at their desks. 
Bureaucratic boxes may be reshuffled, but the basic overhaul of the CIA, FBI 
and NSA remain un-tackled.” 
 
The New York Times reported on 24 July 2002, that some members of Congress 
feared that the nation was slipping into a pattern developed after the Pan Am Flight 
103 incident, that is, setting prompt deadlines for new precautions, then letting them 
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slide. In fact, it was the same pattern from the 60s and 70s with the Cuban and 
Palestinian hijackings. 
 
 In January 2004, the Associated Press reported that airport security screeners perform 
(equally) poorly, whether they're government or privately employed workers as a result 
of an audit. The feeling is no different with the recent release of the Sep 11 
Commission’s report, which many described as a masterpiece of political neutrality. A 
look at history will help. 
 
4.1.1.1   A history of commercial aviation in the USA 
Airline history in the continental United States of America was shaped early in its life 
by the US Postal Service's airmail contract system. In 1917 the U.S. Post Office was 
granted $100,000 to start an experimental airmail service within the USA, which was 
launched on 15 May 1918 with single-engine biplanes. Fledgling airmail companies 
were invited to bid for the contracts and this was extended to allow passenger carriers 
to win routes. The first routes were long haul, trans-continental trunk routes connecting 
major hubs and these routes were what made the major US airlines successful. 
(www.airlinehistory.com). 
Secondary local routes feeding the trans-continental hubs were then awarded. So 
carriers in the US were divided into major and local service companies. In more recent 
times most of these smaller carriers were taken over by the larger ones and so we see 
American, for instance, flying both trunk and feeder services. 
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These fledgling flights covered the USA from East to West coasts and formed the basis 
for the US airline industry that was to follow. On 2 February 1925 the Air Mail Act of 
1925 - the 'Kelly Act' - was passed giving the air mail service over to private airmail 
operators for four-year periods under a bidding scheme.   Bids for the main trans-
continental routes were offered on 15 November 1926.  
Thereafter, the US airline industry was a primarily private affair, with airlines like 
PANAM blazing new trails in airline service. The norm for security arrangements 
rested with the private owners. This was generally accepted until the late 60s and early 
70s when aviation became a target for terrorists. When security costs skyrocketed, 
airlines cried foul and asked for the state to take over what they (the airlines) see as a 
state security problem. 
There were other developments that affected the scope of aviation security. The first  
 
was the era of regulation that was inaugurated with the passing of the Civil  
 
Aeronautics Act in 1938, in response to chaotic economic conditions, little protection  
 
for investors and poor safety margins. The Act regulated technical and safety matters,  
 
competition, route allocation and fares. While it helped make the aviation industry one 
 
 of the safest in the transportation sector, it led to considerable economic and  
 
operational inefficiencies. This led to the deregulation of the industry with the passing  
 
of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. 
 
 
The second development was the end of World War Two and the huge surplus of  
 
aircraft and pilots that resulted in a proliferation of airlines. 
 
 
The third development was the technological innovations in aviation – the advent of  
 
the jet engine in the 60s and the jumbo jet in the 70s - that led to faster and bigger  
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aircraft operating at lower costs resulting in huge increases in passengers. This added  
 
complexities to aviation security that became exacerbated with the targeting of  
 
aviation by terrorists from the 70s. 
 
 
The fourth development was the liberalisation of trade and air services from the 70s  
 
that, coupled with globalisation, led to the rapid expansion of US airlines overseas and  
 
foreign airline operations in the US, which further complicated aviation security. 
 
 
4.1.1.2 The history of airport development 
 
 Airport development in the US had different directions with its varied profiles.  Moore 
(1991) gave the early background: “For most US air terminal and air operations areas, 
security has only recently become the object of serious effort. This new concern was 
forced upon the nation’s airport operators by federal requirements in the wake of 
alarming evidence of airports’ vulnerability to terrorists and other criminal elements”. 
The security presence before the adoption of federal requirements was usually a 
security police force primarily engaged in traffic control and the ticketing of 
improperly parked cars. Little attention was given to the security of the air operations 
area and, when law violations occurred, local law enforcement was usually called to 
handle the matter. 
Moore highlighted the early indifference that has persisted even beyond September 11: 
“The degree of law enforcement protection available to the airport often depended 
upon how much time it took local police to arrive at the airport from downtown. 
Indeed, for many metropolitan areas, the response time was such that the city’s 
downtown bus depot had better police protection than the local airport.” At most US 
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airports, the airport manager included the security function among his many other 
responsibilities, of which security was probably one of the least pressing. 
There are, however some success stories. A few of the larger airports were already 
protected by fine, well-organised policing agencies such as the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, Los Angeles Airport Police and the Port of Seattle Police. 
Equally good departments existed at a few other airports around the country.  
Finance was a major constraint and this was largely because of the varied backgrounds 
to owners and operators of airports. Most US airports are owned by local or regional 
governments, and operated by authorities or commissions responsible to elected 
officials of the particular governmental unit. Whether the airport makes a profit or not, 
any major increase in costs is an immediate financial problem. They can increase 
airport revenue (raise fees), reduce airport services, or draw on general government 
revenue, all with political implications.  
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in an in-depth report in 1995 on the 
failures in aviation security in the US as far back as 1987, also highlighted the complex 
ownership profiles: “Security operations are configured to airport ownership. For 
example, state, authority or local police forces most often oversee the physical security 
of the airport. Private security contractors may also be used. . Air carriers are 
responsible for the physical security of the areas they lease from the airport... It is also 
not uncommon for more than two dozen organizations to share security responsibility 
at a single airport”. 
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So a major problem in the US has been the lack of a single agency with accountability 
for aviation security and the powers to coordinate the different agencies that operate at 
an airport. 
 
4.1.1.3   History of US aviation security 
 Moore (1991) provided the first formal record of the history of aviation security in the 
US. After the first known act of air piracy occurred in 1932, when hijackers took over 
a Peruvian aircraft, there were only 12 US hijacking attempts till 1967, seven of which 
were successful, and all of a criminal nature, involving extortion and other demands. 
The watershed year was 1968, when the Cuban deluge began and reached its peak on 5 
March 1969, with the eighteenth Havana diversion of that year. By the end of 1969, 
trips to Cuba began to taper off. Since November 1972 (and up till 1976), there were 
no successful hijackings in the US. There were only two attempted hijackings of US 
commercial aircraft from July 1973 through June 1974, both unsuccessful, compared 
to 27 hijackings worldwide. 
 
 Moore explains that there were various reasons for the cessation but it was primarily 
the disillusionment over the treatment received by hijackers in Cuba. International 
indifference and differences of opinion on the question of the relative morality of air 
piracy as an instrument for political change made matters worse.  General agreement 
was needed if air piracy was to be abated everywhere. The ICAO took no action on air 
piracy until June 1970 and even omitted the problem in its 1963 Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft. Finally, the 1970 
ICAO action saw a resolution condemning all acts of violence directed against 
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personnel, airports, and facilities, and called for strengthening extradition 
arrangements. 
 
The American government’s response had not helped either, with months of 
procrastination coupled with what Moore describes as the ambivalent attitude to 
hijacking in other circumstances: “In the eyes of a United States citizen, 
commandeering an airplane to escape to the West from behind the Iron Curtain is seen 
as justified, admirable, and even praise worthy, while the hijacking of an airplane to 
Cuba by persons seeking to flee from the United States is seen as wrong and even 
despicable”. Ironically, three months after commercial aircraft hijacking ended, the 
United States and Cuba finally signed a pact to either extradite or punish with “the 
most severe penalty” any aircraft hijacker landing in either country from the other. 
 
Moore mentions Dr David Hubbard, Director of the Aberrant Behaviour Centre, 
Dallas, Texas, who did considerable research on US hijackers, and cites as contributing 
factors, besides the abolition of Cuba as a ‘safe haven’, “the end of the Vietnam war, 
the welcome given returning prisoners of war, and the virtual abolition of the death 
penalty by a Supreme Court decision…The government attributes the cessation of 
hijacking to their strict screening programme, and it is with this theory that the airlines 
tend to agree”. 
  
Again, this debate about the real reasons for the decline is characteristic of the US and 
prevents from them tackling the problem at its source. It is a debate that continues and 
resumes after each tragedy. 
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Another watershed year was 1970, when large-scale hijacking began. On September 6 
1970, terrorists hijacked a TWA 707 on a flight from Frankfurt to New York City, a 
Swissair DC-8 outbound from Zurich, and a Pan Am 747 out of Amsterdam. Three 
days later, on September 9, a BOAC VC-10 was hijacked. The Pan Am plane was 
flown to Cairo by way of Beirut, where the plane was blown up the day after it was 
hijacked while the other three aircraft were forced to fly to Dawson Field, Jordan 
where the 500 passengers and crewmembers suffered six days of terrible confinement 
before they were allowed to exit and the three planes were blown up. 
 
Following this and a further series of hijacking incidents in the early 1970s, public and 
congressional interest in aviation security increased, with laws that strengthened the 
FAA’s mandate to ensure civil aviation security and directing it to require anti-
hijacking passenger and baggage-screening procedures. In the 1980s, the increased 
terrorist attacks on aviation globally led to the FAA focusing on improving baseline 
security for international threats and taking action to protect US carrier operations at 
foreign stations: “The International Security and Development Co-operation Act 1985, 
signed by the President in August, authorised the increased funding for research and 
development of airport security devices and explosives detection techniques. It also 
mandated a system for conducting security assessments at foreign airports and 
authorised Federal Air Marshals as a permanent FAA workforce.” (Kraus and Brecht-
Clark 2001).  
 
The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 on 14 June 1987 and the downing of an Air India 
flight, killing all 329 persons aboard nine days later, showed that Americans faced a 
significant and lethal terrorist threat while flying abroad. Unlike previous attacks, the 
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intent to cause mass casualties became evident and helped to solidify public and 
congressional support for a strong FAA civil aviation security programme. 
 
In 1987, a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) task force recommended that the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) develop a plan to standardize airport security. 
In 1988, Congress passed legislation requiring all U.S. airports to computer control 
access to aeronautical operations area. 
 
Several months later, two-near simultaneous terrorist attacks on airports in Rome and 
Vienna added urgency to the FAA’s work to protect US citizens abroad. Those attacks 
caused the deaths of 20 persons, including five US citizens, and injured 120 people. 
Then the turning point - the terrorist bombing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing 259 passengers and crewmembers - 
led to the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. It 
recommended that the FAA pursue a more rigorous programme in aviation security 
research and development and to take other steps to counter the terrorist threat to the 
civil aviation system. 
 
            The President’s Commission, in part, so uncannily reminiscent of the post 
September 11 deliberations, recommended: 
• That Congress should require criminal record checks for all airport employees and 
identify criminal records that would disqualify individuals from airport 
employment 
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• That the FAA develop stronger security measures for controls over checked 
baggage, controls over persons with access to aircraft, testing of security systems, 
the use of modern X-ray equipment, and the pre-screening of passengers 
• That the FAA take the lead in stressing the role of human factors in the security 
equation and that training must be improved 
• That the FAA Administrator should establish an office of security reporting 
directly to (the Administrator)  
• That the Secretary of Transportation appoint, on an interim basis, a Secretarial 
Assistant Secretary for Aviation Security and Intelligence and obtain legislative 
authorization to appoint an Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Security and 
Intelligence to develop policy and long term strategy for dealing with threats 
• That federal security managers be put in place at the nation’s airports. 
 
The Commission, in a strongly worded statement, concluded: “The most critical 
elements in aviation security will continue to be people and the procedures which 
guide them. Effective security can best be achieved with a single strong manager who 
directs a highly integrated system, staffed by well-trained, motivated workers. To that 
end, qualification and training standards for airport personnel are crucial.”          
 
In 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act, which incorporated 
many of the Commission’s recommendations and instructed FAA to make 
improvements in aviation security. The Act provided new authority for the FAA to 
strengthen aviation security through accelerated research and development. The 
agency intensified its research and development efforts to enhance aviation security 
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and, in 1992, opened an expanded security research laboratory at its Technical Centre 
in New Jersey. 
 
Aviation continued to be a key target for terrorists. In 1994, Manila police uncovered a 
plot by terrorist Ramzi Yousef to blow up 12 US airline flights operating between East 
Asia and the US. Kraus and Brecht-Clark (2001), in a defence of FAA efforts, wrote 
that: “ Although he never carried out the plot, Mr Yousef later admitted that he had 
aborted an attack against one of his targets because he believed that the US air carrier’s 
security measures at the chosen airport were too stringent.” 
 
Shortly after the July 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800, the US president created a White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security chaired by Vice President Al 
Gore. The group had to develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, 
both within the US and abroad. In its final report, the Commission made it clear that 
criminal acts against civil aviation over recent years have demonstrated that terrorists 
have an increasing level of knowledge in the design and deployment of explosive 
devices. The US aviation security system must be capable of adapting to meet all new 
challenges. Congress responded by requiring, among other actions, the FAA to 
purchase significant numbers of computed tomography detection systems, automated 
X-ray machinery and other innovative explosives detection systems to place in 
airports.  
 
One has to recognise the fact that within the labyrinthine corridors of American power, 
the FAA did do some good. Kraus and Brecht-Clark (2001) explained that: “From 
1987 through 1992, 38 terrorist incidents occurred, 31 incidents took place as 
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suspected terrorism, and 24 terrorist acts were prevented on U.S. soil. Much of the 
security efforts aimed at stopping terrorist acts against American carriers and their 
passengers is focused on preventing the individual or group from reaching airport 
facilities in the first place”. The various different and varied measures such as 
international cooperation and coordination of intelligence, vast improvements in the 
use of technology in tracking and profiling suspected terrorists, and unseen security 
measures at airports appeared to have proven successful in minimizing the terrorist and 
criminal threat to airport facilities. According to the FAA, in 1992 alone, 1 billion air 
travellers used the nation’s airports. Two thousand three hundred and fifty three 
firearms and 15 explosives were confiscated resulting in 1337 arrests.  
 
Then September 11 happened and all hell broke loose. In characteristic American 
fashion, a whole host of recommendations were made that led to intense debate in 
Congress, in the media and all manner of institutions. A major effect was the renewed 
call to federalize all security screeners. 
 
4.1.1.4   To privatise or not 
The privatisation debate in the US is a complex one, with politics, lobby groups, size 
of the nation, all playing a role.  
 
The cynical view of privatisation was expressed by Economist Paul Krugman in the 
New York Times that was carried in the Straits Times in 2003 and titled “Bush’s jobs 
Plan: Efficiency or just politics”. He said that the often-stated purpose to open up 
federal jobs to private competition is to promote efficiency but the experience has been 
that   private contractors bid low to get the business, and then gradually raise their 
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prices up after the government workforce has been disbanded. He feels that it is all 
about providing political cover. The administration must make a show of cutting 
spending, but would not be able to cut essential services like defence or the justice 
system or entitlements like Social security: “So privatising federal jobs is a perfect 
answer to this dilemma… give the impression that the administration is doing 
something about the deficit…a way to break one of the last remaining strongholds of 




Similarly, one would think that the US would lead in privatisation efforts in all 
aviation sectors. But this is surprisingly not the case with air traffic services, 
confirming the view that politics and power have a large role to play. Jane’s Airport 
website reported in 2004 that “The United States may be the bastion of free enterprise, 
but it remains opposed to privatisation of air traffic control. As more nations move in 
this direction, and with its northern neighbour, Canada, apparently demonstrating the 
success of the concept, the American reluctance puzzles many foreign observers”. The 
provision of air traffic services has become a major business undertaking. In all cases 
of privatisation, the new organisations had brought about faster decision-making, 
increased operating efficiency, reduced excess staff and lowered operating costs.  
 
So why are the Americans so averse to privatisation? The answer lies in politics. Jane’s 
Airport (2004) reported that the most powerful opposition comes from US Congress: 
“After the US military, the FAA has one of the largest spending programmes: over 
US$100 billion for the modernisation of air traffic services over the next 10 years. 
Congress is reluctant to relinquish its political control over such funds.” 
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The other objections come from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) 
who feel that privatisation would force their over 300,000 members to pay user fees on 
top of their fuel taxes and fear that a privatised system would slowly change to favour 
airline operations, particularly around major population centres. What is strange that 
AOPA is reported as also objecting to the concept of separating the regulatory and 
operational functions of the FAA, which most ICAO members recognise as one of the 
most important and essential benefits of privatisation. 
 
The US National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), representing the operators 
of 13,000 business aircraft in the US, also opposes privatisation, and agrees with 
AOPA on many issues. Outside the US, the general and business aviation community 
is not large enough to have the political clout it does in the US, where it can often 
make its voice heard in Congress. 
 
Another powerful opposition voice is the US National Air Traffic Controllers 
Association  (NATCA), which has rejected privatisation at a number of Congressional 
hearings probably because of concerns about job security of its members. Like AOPA 
and NBAA, NATCA is against the separation of the regulatory and operational 
elements of air traffic services, and also states that an efficient air traffic system, which 
has been developed over many years, should not be transferred to a profit-making 
private organisation. 
 
All this makes the reverse debate in aviation security very strange indeed, with decades 
of insistence on keeping screening in private hands. Sengupta (2001) writes about this 
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totally different trend after September 11: “ Thus far, the dominant mantra has been 
that the market would solve all problems. The ease with which 19 hijackers boarded 
four commercial airlines from three airports has exposed the lax security system in US-
based airports… The entire security set-up in US airports is in the private sector”. The 
bidding system led to a downward spiral in quality. In the US, a baggage handler who 
examines passenger baggage is paid on average US$7 an hour by the private 
companies while in Europe the worker is paid $15 an hour plus benefits. As a result 
security personnel are poorly paid and usually with no skills or interest in the job 
(Vincent 2000). 
 
Sengupta highlighted the fact that two US presidential commissions and many reports 
of supervisory bodies have drawn attention to the defects in airport security. A 
consistent recommendation was the federalisation of airport security, through a federal 
government agency that directly handles security with its own personnel. These 
repeated recommendations were rejected as the dominant philosophy in the 
government and the US Congress was to cut back on government services and push for 
privatisation.  
 
So the situation was allowed to continue despite the fact that the FAA filed cases of 
numerous violations of security by private airlines. Even after September 11, there was 
considerable opposition to federalisation of airport security and the final Airport 
Security Bill that was passed was much watered down. There is still talk of using 
private security. This politicising of the decision making process in the US means that 
the solutions are less than ideal. In the case of the establishment of the TSA, there was 
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a reluctance to look at successful foreign models and the final structure appears to be 
problematic (Aviation Daily 2002, Bernard 2001, Bovard 2004). 
 
4.1.2   UK and Europe: Partnerships  
In Europe, the tradition of heavy state involvement in aviation and the attacks on 
aviation have meant that the state continued to control all aviation security functions 
but with managed outsourcing to private firms (Jenkins 2002). This is particularly so in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands (O’Connor 2002). 
 
In the Netherlands, three government ministries control security at all airports. 
Working together, these ministries hire private contractors to provide airport security 
services and work in unison with a local police force (Jenkins 2002). The importance 
of state control was re-emphasised recently with a reversal of a plan to privatise 
Schipol Airport for fear of it getting into foreign hands (O’Connor 2002). 
 
In the UK, the government is very heavily involved in aviation security, primarily 
because it is in the frontline against Irish and Middle Eastern terrorism. It appears to 
have a right balance between regulation and delegation of operational duties to private 
or corporatised bodies. The Department of Transport oversees all policies and 
coordination and audits all security, which have to be carried out by the owners of the 
respective aviation assets. So the primary responsibility for airport security measures at 
the operational level falls to the airport authorities. They hire private security 




However, a recent study (Wheeler 2003) revealed a lack of a single coordinating 
agency or process, similar to the situation in the US prior to the TSA, and efforts are 
being made to address this.  Nevertheless, the arrangements in the UK appear to be 
working well through a tight partnership between public and private bodies. 
 
 Watson (2002) highlights the case of one good model:  “ Manchester International 
Airport is a classic example of successful corporatisation and commercialisation 
without the need for privatisation”. Like many airports in the UK, it is a municipal 
regional airport owned by the city and its surrounding metropolitan boroughs. 
However in its organisational structure it has adopted the management and operation 
style and features of a private limited company. Manchester’s development has been 
funded by a combination of public monies (Terminal 2), its own funds (Runway 2) and 
through private investment (Terminal 3). It is only one of five public companies that 
can seek funding from the markets and is limited, for strategic reasons, to UK 
investments. Its independence and commercial dynamism are illustrated by its 
acquisition trail (recently purchasing Humberside, East Midlands and Bournemouth 
airports) and its willingness to sell its environmental, security, training and 
management expertise to other airports. In the area of aviation security, it established 
the world’s first centralised baggage hold screening system and became a benchmark 
for other airports. It is also a leading training centre for aviation security. 
 
Another good model is Newcastle Airport in Northeast England, often cited as a prime 
example of a successful PPP. It is half owned by the local government, which gives it 
more than adequate strategic control, while the other half was sold to Copenhagen 
Airport to provide the commercial expertise and synergy (O’Connor 2002). 
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4.2     MODELS WITH REGIONAL INTEREST 
4.2.1   Australia: A long federal experience 
The Australian experience with Aviation Security is a characteristic reflection of all 
the issues of privatisation and state control and the various overlaps between 
companies, states and central (or Federal) governments. The reasons for this are the 
early involvement of the government in aviation, the need to establish federal forces to 
tackle federal police and security issues in which privatised forces have limited roles 
and resources, and the responses to world terrorist threats. All these were issues, which 
were common to all nations with Federal structures. What was particularly unique to 
Australia was the original fiercely independent-mindedness of the states. 
 
The study of the Australian system is helped by the extensive documentation of 
aviation security arrangements, in particular, the book,  “Changing the Guard - A 
history of the Australian Protective Service” by Peter Donovan on the organisation 
(APS) that currently overseas much of aviation security in Australia. Much of this 
chapter will rely on this book and all page references in this chapter relate to this book. 
The title itself – “Changing the Guard” - is an apt description of the various changes in 
aviation security and the trends for and against privatisation. 
 
The history of aviation security in Australia starts with the usual measures against 
theft, trespass, etc. These were provided by the owners of these assets – state 
governments running airports, privately owned   airlines.  This changed a little with the 
looming threat of World War Two and thereafter, significantly, with international 
terrorism targeting aviation. Both these threats were appropriately met by the 
deployment of Federal forces so it would be useful to look at the history that lead to 
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the current deployment of a federal agency - the Australian Protective Service - to 
guard all airports and do some of the screening. The history will reflect the concern 
about government involvement, Federal control of national (as against state) assets, 
commercialisation, recovery of aviation security costs, the need for police powers but 
only partially and unionisation. 
 
The first Commonwealth (the Australian term for federal) Police Force was established 
on 2 December 1917 “ under the War Precautions Regulations of 1915 as a form of a 
federal special branch – a police force under the authority of the Federal Attorney-
General that could take measures that were necessary for the enforcement throughout 
the Commonwealth of the laws of the Commonwealth.” (page 5). In February 1919, it 
was replaced by a Commonwealth Investigation Branch under the control of the 
Attorney General’s Department. 
 
Yet another force - Peace Officers - was established on 2 September 1925 for the 
preservation of peace throughout the Commonwealth. Donovan felt that Peace 
Officers, rather than the first Commonwealth Police, were the true predecessors of the 
Australian Protective Service, as they reflected the characteristic need in Aviation 
Security for a special force without the high cost and full powers of regular police 
officers. “The powers conferred by the Peace Officers’ Act 1925 applied only in 
relation to breaches of Commonwealth laws, and officers were to do nothing that 
might encroach upon the duties of State police ‘with whom every effort is to be made 
to cultivate good feeling and understanding’”(page 14). A member of the Guard could, 
without warrant, arrest any person if he or she believed a federal offence had been 
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committed, but was immediately required to hand over that person to the nearest State 
police station.  
 
The Commonwealth Government created a second Commonwealth Police Force in 
1927 to guard the Australian Capital Territory. 
 
In 1932, Harold Jones, Superintending Peace Officer, reported the implication to 
security of a strike by civilian guards at a munitions plant: “ I recommended that a new 
uniform watching service should be created, members of which would be invested with 
the powers under the Peace Officers Act, that it would be a disciplined force and that 
whilst it could have its own Union or other organisation for its welfare, it was not to be 
permitted to become part of the Munitions Employees Union”. 
 
It was an insightful understanding of some of the union problems that afflict other 
AVSEC organisations and the need for a government agency to guard strategic 
installations. 
 
So the dedicated guarding service known as the Defence Establishment Guard was set 
up in April 1935 to guard defence establishments in Victoria and New South Wales. 
The increasing threat of war during the 1930s and the shortcomings in the system of 
watchmen at major munitions factories persuaded the government to upgrade its 
provisions for security. The outbreak of World War Two had an immediate impact on 
the guard and underscored the necessity for such a service. Early in 1941 the Defence 
Establishment Guard also took charge of major oil installations and certain civil 
aerodromes which had been protected by Garrison Battalion troops, the first time a 
dedicated force was deployed to guard aerodromes and hence the beginnings of an 
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aviation security force. This was also the beginning of government involvement in 
aviation security, albeit in a small scale. Out of 2552 personnel in 1943, only 2 were 
for civil aviation. 
 
This force and the Commonwealth Investigation Service were merged on 21 April 
1960 to form the Commonwealth Police Force.   
 
Donovan reports another significant milestone in the development of a dedicated 
aviation security force, in December 1974, as international terrorism became an 
increasingly significant threat even in Australia, and the government decided that 
security should be upgraded at Australia’s main airports. Uniformed Commonwealth 
Police were stationed at airports in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Darwin, 
Adelaide, Cairns, Townsville, Hobart and Canberra. These officers received 
specialised training on airport security and aviation procedures and attracted a higher 
salary than members of the existing uniforms Branch (page 38). Increased terrorist 
threats and activities worldwide and in Australia and an increase in international and 
cross-state border organised and white-collar crime, ensured that the federal and state 
governments continued to grapple with the idea of an appropriate federal law 
enforcement authority that would meet these threats (page 40). A further restructuring 
took place with the establishment of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) on 19 
October 1979, with a Protective Service Component for guarding duties. Later, on 20 
October 1984, this became a separate body – The Australian Protective Service – in 
recognition of the logic that separation of duties would “obviate the need to have 
highly trained police officers on what were essentially care taking duties (page 55)”. 
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The APS was formally established with a relatively narrow charter - to guard 
Commonwealth establishments of significance to national security or establishments 
involved in sensitive or hazardous activities, such as nuclear facilities and also to 
provide a custodial service at Commonwealth immigration detention centres and 
guarding services at several of Australia’s overseas diplomatic posts (pg 65). 
 
It had a unique role as described very well by former Australian Prime Minister Peter 
Keating in his foreword to Donovan’s book:  
 “Protection is about interposing a force between evil intent and tragic 
consequence. It is a noble function…It is not an easy task that the APS has. It is 
responsible for premises which the public simply expects to be protected with 
100 per cent effectiveness. Diplomatic premises, for example. At the same time, 
many of these are public premises, where it is imperative that restrictions on 
access be minimal, such as Parliament House…Ordinary policing is not the 
answer, because some of those who threaten high profile installations or people 
positively want to be caught. Protection is the name of the game.” 
 
The AFP and some State forces continued with the guarding of airports. On 21 
November 1989, the government decided that the counter-terrorist first response 
activities at all of Australia’s major airports should remain with a Commonwealth 
agency. Indeed, it decided that the APS should assume the function, which it did from 
19 January 1990 at Perth and then the rest of the airports in stages. 
 
This was the beginning of a truly aviation security force in line with trends in the rest 
of the world and the increasingly complex demands of guarding aviation assets. The 
APS currently guards all major international airports in Australia, with screening of 
passengers left to airlines but policed rigorously by the Department of Aviation.  
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The unique structure of the APS and the need to adapt to the security challenges and 
contemporary thinking in organisation structures and functions and the role of 
government made it agonise over a number of issues that hold valuable lessons for 
other aviation security forces grappling with similar issues. 
 
Donovan describes the problems of transition between civil service and uniformed 
force. The status as public servants apparently created obstacles to the development of 
a unified and proud culture expected of a uniformed and disciplined organisation, with 
entrenched attitudes and practices that undermined management efforts to encourage a 
positive and dynamic culture. There were also chain-of-command problems as 
personnel used to a civilian structure made appeals over the heads of managers (page 
64). 
 
Then there was the issue of commercialisation, with uneasiness felt over the dire 
implications of the Hawke government introducing cost-recovery policies and the user-
pays principle for government services. Few of the APS staff believed that they could 
compete successfully with private security firms and many feared that “clients would 
seek to be free of the necessity of using the APS if the service could not demonstrate 
that it was providing value for money (page 74)”. 
 
The challenge of developing a more commercial organisation responsive to the needs 
of clients and to organisational change was a fundamental challenge facing those 
responsible for the new guarding service. “The police culture, with which many 
officers were imbued and which they brought with them when they transferred from 
the Australian Federal Police, was no longer appropriate (page 75)”. The leader, Peter 
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Dawson, had no previous model to follow but he knew that the Australian Protective 
Service should not be another police force, or reflect a military model, even though 
officers from such backgrounds were fundamental to the early growth and 
development of the service. He spoke constantly and frequently of the need to provide 
service and to be alive to the demands of clients. Like some of the other visionary 
aviation security heads in other countries, he also considered training as the key to the 
development of high service standards and as a means of raising morale within the 
organisation (page 77). 
 
But all the efforts bore fruit in the report by the Efficiency Scrutiny Unit in 1986: 
“ The APS is a youthful organisation still putting finishing touches to its role and 
method of operation. It inherited from the Australian Federal Service a run down 
operation with many dissatisfied clients. It has in its short existence turned that 
situation around. Amongst its clients there is often praise for the service it now 
provides. The demand for its services now exceeds its ability to supply (page 95)”. 
 
The conclusion to the Australian experience is that by design and accident, Australia  
 
has developed, for a nation with a federal structure, probably the best framework that  
 
balances security with facilitation and controls costs. It is indeed a pity that the  
 




4.2.2 Hong Kong: A role model? 
All Aviation Security functions in Hong Kong are handled by a single government 
agency, the Aviation Security Company Limited (AVSECO). AVSECO was 
established in 1997 and is jointly owned by the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) 
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and the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) Government. Prior to that, 
aviation security was handled by a private company, Securair, which was wholly 
owned by Cathay Pacific Airways. However, with the handover of Hong Kong to 
China, it was felt that aviation security could not continue in a private company with 
considerable foreign (British) interests. So the monopoly was taken away from 
Securair and vested in a newly established government owned company. Most of 
Securair’s staff were absorbed by AVSECO (Cheung 2004). 
The top management of AVSECO [including General Manager, Deputy General 
Manager and the two Assistant General Managers (Operations)] are senior officers of 
the SAR Government on secondment from Security Bureau, HK Police and Customs 
& Excise Service respectively. AVSECO employs over 2,800 full time staff and 
operates on a 24-hour basis, providing a wide range of aviation security services at 
more than 50 locations within the airport. 
AVSECO is a non-profit making company operating on a cost recovery basis. The 
quality of AVSECO's aviation security service has been independently assessed by 
various overseas aviation authorities as being comparable to the best international 
practice. Moreover, the security systems at Hong Kong International Airport, which 
are operated by AVSECO, are widely acknowledged to be among the best in the world 
(Chow 2002, Anderson 2003). 
In April 2000, at the 5th Asia Pacific Aviation Security Conference and Exhibition 
organised by SATS Security in Singapore, AVSECO won the Merit Award for 
Outstanding Aviation Security Organisation. The citation mentioned the  "excellence 
in providing all security services at Hong Kong International Airport". Its General 
Manager, Sidney Chau, won an Outstanding AVSEC Official Award. In October 2001, 
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at the AVSEC WORLD 2001 Conference organised by both IATA and Airports 
Council International in Atlanta, USA, AVSECO was elected the "Outstanding 
AVSEC Organisation" for the Aviation Security International Award of Excellence. 
AVSECO therefore is an outstanding example of corporatisation – the government 
maintaining full ownership and control but run like a private enterprise with a 
considerable degree of independence in many matters other than aviation security 
policy and standards which remain with the Department of Transport’s Aviation 
Security Authority. 
AVSECO’s success has much to do with its founding General Manager, Sidney Chau, 
seconded from the HK Police. His police knowledge was combined well with a 
business acumen that saw AVSECO expanding to the training and consultancy 
business (Aviation Security International 2002). This gave it international exposure 
that helped it improve its own operational performance (Chao 2002). 
A major reason for the success of Hong Kong’s system is the clear separation between 
the regulatory authority and the operational unit, which is AVSECO. The Department 
of Transport also takes an active and rigorous role in monitoring AVSECO. As an 
example of its strict adherence to accountability is the following chapter from its 
charter: 
   An organisation which is required to submit a security programme under the 
Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme shall be held accountable by the 
Aviation Security Authority for the standard of the measures that form part of 
its security programme.  If the organisation appoints a security contractor then 
the contractual or other relationship between the organisation (i.e., the 
‘principal’) and its contractor is a matter for the companies concerned.  It 
follows that if the security contractor fails to meet the standards or objectives 
required in the organisation’s security programme, it will be deemed to be a 
deficiency on the principal’s part and action may be taken against the latter by 
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the Aviation Security Authority, under the provisions of the Aviation Security 
Ordinance. 
 
One of the failings of the US system was the repeated failure by the FAA to impose 
accountability amongst the stakeholders, particularly airlines (Aviation Week 2001). 
One of AVSECO’s major strengths that have allowed it to meet the high standards set 
by the regulator is the emphasis on Training, a critical factor in the success of any 
aviation security outfit (Chow 2002). The financial and operational independence it 
has, free of the bureaucratic bottlenecks of the civil service, has allowed it to invest in 
the latest training equipment and enter into business alliances that not only reduce the 
cost of this expensive equipment but also earn some revenue and add security 
technology expertise to its workforce (Cheung 2004). 
On top of that, AVSECO made it a point to go beyond the minimum set by the 
regulators, which was already stringent in the first place. As an example is the 
following requirement for training from its HR Manual: 
   Persons engaged in the aviation security functions listed in Section A, para. 3.1, 
are required to undergo and pass a course covering the minimum training 
objectives laid down in the modules in Schedule 1 to this Appendix.  These 
training objectives are grouped into one foundation module (which all personnel 
are required to take) and 9 other modules relating to specific security functions.  It 
is emphasised that these training requirements are in addition to any training that 




There are also strict requirements for certification and the manner of delivery that 
ensure high standards, as set out in the Authority’s charter: 
The Aviation Security Authority considers that the most effective and practical 
means of assessing the competence of an x-ray operator is to use a purpose 
designed computer based training/assessment system.  A number of different 
systems are commercially available.   A proposal to use a test format which does 
 93 
not use such a computer-based system is unlikely to be considered acceptable to 
the Aviation Security Authority. 
 
The fact that there is only one aviation security agency has helped in maintaining 
consistent standards, better coordination and reduced overheads. However, this same 
monopoly and the fact that AVSECO operates on a cost-recovery basis are seen as a 
major weakness in the Hong Kong system. Many airlines have complained about the 
high charges and lack of competitive choices. AVSECO has also been criticised for 
being distracted from its core mission by going into training and consultancy and other 
activities, which would not have been possible if it was a purely state agency or 
government department or had competitive pressures. The DOT addresses these 
concerns by regularly reviewing the charges and discussing these complaints at 
internal forums. It also regularly compares the rates in Hong Kong with those at other 
airports in the region (Bradbrook 2004). 
With the growth of competing hubs in China, Hong Kong and AVSECO will certainly 
face pressures on rates. E-Turbo News, an e-newsletter for the travel industry, reported 
the opening in July 2004 of China’s largest airport, Baiyun International Airport in 
Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Province — dubbed the factory of the world, 
responsible for over a third of China's exports -- establishing a giant freight and 
passenger hub to rival neighbouring Hong Kong. 
The report noted that the new airport is poised to become a major player in the regional 
aviation market, most notably at the expense of neighbouring Hong Kong International 
Airport, less than 100 kilometers (60 miles) away. While Hong Kong is the world’s 
largest hub for airfreight, Baiyun, in the centre of China's manufacturing engine, would 
rob it of vital trade.  
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The challenge for AVSECO will be to lower its rates while maintaining the high 
quality of security service. There is however a bright spot as reported by E-turbo News 
that Hong Kong still has the advantage as China's aviation infrastructure struggles to 
modernize. Hong Kong has the global connectivity that China does not. Most of all, 
AVSECO can continue to be a good role model, particularly for China where security 
is done by state agencies who are still unfamiliar with the concept of service and not 
exposed enough to the rule of local and international law. 
 
4.2.3    India: A federal extreme 
India is the archetypical example of a single federal agency controlling all security at 
all airports. This was as a result of India’s own post-independence emphasis on central 
planning and control, the government ownership of all aviation assets including its 
national airlines, and the attacks on aviation by terrorist groups, first the separatist 
Sikhs and later Kashmiri separatists. So it has been a front-line state for a long time 
and the emphasis on central control continues. 
 
 Lal (2004) said that Indian thinking is that all security must continue to be the 
responsibility of the state:  
“Policy and monitoring is laid down by the State; perimeter security, building 
access, personnel and baggage checks, checking cargo require varied skills and 
are covered by a variety of rules and regulations; and different ‘State ‘ agencies 
are empowered by law to take action; implementation ought not be delegated to 
semi-autonomous public agencies, airlines or private organisations; varied 
agencies dealing with different areas and tasks leaves gaps or leads to tension in 
the overlaps; allocating costs and collecting monies can be a source of irritation 
amongst airlines, airports and other agencies”. 
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As examples, he cited the fact that only a federal agency can address the new 
requirements for identifying frequent flyers, have a comprehensive policy on machine 
readable travel documents, push the greater use of information technology in travellers 
data exchange and identify frequent exporters and importers of cargo. In the area of 
biometrics for passengers and employees, only a federal agency can tackle the problem 
of a commonality of technologies amongst agencies at an airport and between airports. 
 
Sengupta (2001) reports the aggressive initiatives of the Indian Government with a 
comprehensive, coordinated review by the Intelligence Bureau, the Airports Authority 
of India, The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), the Central Industrial 
Security Force and the Police. The review covered perimeter security, smart cards, 
close circuit television, baggage screening systems, sky marshals and new laws. One of 
the notable moves is a world-first by the BCAS, which oversees all aviation security in 
India, to introduce biometric profiling of air passengers. A pilot project has been 
launched in Bangalore and Hyderabad. 
 
While a federal system has indeed led to the right kind of coordinated response, there 
are major weaknesses typical of centralised state structures.  Lal (2003) lists them as 
reactive management practices, poor commercial outlook, poor efficiency of 
personnel, slow response in pricing changes, hidden manning costs, high manpower 
costs, and a restrictive personnel regulatory regime amongst other issues.  
 
A major weakness observed by the writer and the common refrain amongst travellers 
to India is the poor service levels of security personnel. The mindset is one of policing 
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to the total exclusion of service and facilitation. Some foreign airlines have pushed for 
privatisation of ground handling activities. Ground Handling magazine (August 2003) 
reports the Director Public Relations for Air India, Jitender Bhargava, as saying that 
“Handling is not their (the airlines) core business, so we are looking for a more 
focussed, more customer-oriented approach…that can enhance security and have better 
control overall.” If airport standards in India are to reach the better ones, then a federal 
arrangement may have to be modified. 
 
4.2.4   Israel: A benchmark model with international impact 
As a country under perpetual siege for more than 50 years, the issue of whether state 
forces do a better job in Israel rarely arises because everyone takes security seriously – 
the government, corporations, schools, families, private establishments, even religious 
organisations. Though this is not a realistic model for large and open societies like 
America, there are clear lessons to be learnt about how proper priorities and 
management can make the difference, regardless of the nature of the organisation, 
about how business and government can find a middle ground between complacency 
and paranoia. Adopting and adapting some of Israel’s methods can improve security 
without a radical reordering of the free world’s way of life for much of what is done in 
Israel, particularly the high level coordination and preparation, is behind the scenes 
and would not violate civil rights or offend the average citizen. 
 
The government has total involvement in the security of aviation – owning the airports 
and airline and guarding all assets. Ground protection at the airports is provided by the 
public airport authority in combination with Police and military units.  Private 
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organisations have their own arrangements to add to the layers of security, ensuring a 
proper balance of public and private involvement. In all sectors, guards are paid 
adequately, trained well and continually tested through a range of intrusion tests and 
simulations. All airport employees are screened by the government’s internal security 
service and anyone applying to be a pilot goes through extensive background checks. 
 
In an article in Fortune magazine of 21 January 2002, Nelson D. Schwartz wrote: “If 
there is a single company that symbolises the Israeli approach to security, it’s El Al. As 
the flag carrier of the Jewish state (even after a decade of privatisation efforts in Israel, 
El Al is government owned), the airline is perhaps the most tempting terrorist target in 
the world. But the company long ago turned that disadvantage into an asset – tight 
security is a key part of its appeal to potential passengers”. 
 
El Al has therefore been mentioned frequently as a model for US airlines trying to 
restore confidence in air travel (CNN 2001). Its secret is not just its celebrated 
profiling and screening method of asking tough questions, or armed sky marshals on 
every flight, or engaging in a degree of ethnic profiling but having a well thought-out, 
rigorously planned approach to security at every level. El Al is estimated to spend 
US$100 million a year on security, with the Israeli government covering roughly two-
thirds of the bill. This is about 2% of revenues compared to the one-tenth of one 
percent by US carriers who still complain. 
 
Schwartz describes El Al’s meticulous attention to security long before September 
11: 
 
 “Even after the questions and the searches, El Al’s security procedures aren’t 
finished. All checked baggage is x-rayed, which US airlines are still struggling to 
do more than four months after September’s attacks. If something seems odd 
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about a cargo shipment, El Al puts it in a decompression chamber on the ground 
to test for bombs set to go off at high altitudes. Checked luggage is stored in a 
secure room that’s constantly guarded by El Al personnel. And once the luggage 
goes on the plane, El Al closely tracks which container it’s in, so if the passenger 
fails to board, the bag can be pulled quickly without holding everything up” 
(Fortune 21 January 2002).  
 
Well before the post September 11 frenzy, El Al already had reinforced double doors 
to protect the cockpit so pilots can come and go without opening the inner door to the 
rest of the cabin. When customers are cleared because their answers make sense and 
their luggage is clean but still fit a suspicious profile, the sky marshal is told of their 
presence and seat numbers. The passengers will never know about the extra attention 
until they do something suspicious. This is in stark contrast to the frequent media 
reports about the shuttle to Washington’s Reagan National Airport, where passengers 
are forbidden to get up and go to the bathroom for much of the flight. 
 
One cannot use the argument that EL Al can do this because it is government owned. 
Even private companies take the same approach to investing in security. The David 
Citadel Hotel in Jerusalem, for instance, spends 8% of its payroll on security, 
compared to the 1% to 2% in a typical US hotel. The difference in Israel is the 
understanding that security can only work if all sectors work together in their separate 
roles. The state focuses on overall policy and strategy and international coordination, 
while the private sector concentrates on what it can do well, on details, service levels, 
feedback and knowing the ground.  
 
4.2.5    Malaysia: Competence issues 
The set-up in Malaysia followed the regime of the UK fairly closely as a result of 
British colonial rule. It also followed the British lead in the privatisation of airports. 
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The first stage was the corporatisation of the operational wings of the Department of 
Civil Aviation on November 1 1992 with the establishment of Malaysia Airports 
Holdings Berhad (MAHB). 
 
MAHB took over the overall management, operation and maintenance of all 
commercial airports.  Ali (2004) reported that this was in line with the government’s 
privatisation policy introduced in 1983, aimed at lessening the financing and 
administrative burden of government and providing an opportunity for the private 
sector to participate actively in the economic development of the country. 
 
This was fairly successful with a significant growth of earnings through what Ali 
reported as “active pursuit of commercial opportunities and airport related business, 
prudent financial practices, diligent management and customer focussed activities”. 
This early success spurred the move to full privatisation, primarily for financial and 
funding reasons. The privatisation of MAB took place in November 1999 and appears 
to have been a success, based on the performance of all airports in Malaysia 
(Mahmood 2003). 
 
However, the performance of its security force has been mixed. Corporatisation and 
privatisation of the security force had seen big leaps in professionalism, specialisation, 
training standards, national standardisation and coordination. However, on the ground, 
there have been a number of lapses that has caused government intervention and 
criticism, even to the point of considering a takeover by the Police. The industry 
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perception is that this was primarily a problem of efficiency. Ali reported that reviews 
are in place to address these problems. 
 
4.2.6   New Zealand: A recognised benchmark 
“What is all the fuss about, we have been doing it that way for years”. In a dig at the 
pre-September 11 neglect and the post-September 11 overreaction by the Americans, 
this was the title of a talk given by Mark Everitt, the General Manager of the Aviation 
Security Service of New Zealand (NZ AVSEC), at the 5th Aviation Security 
Conference organised by SATS Security in Singapore in April 2002. The author of this 
thesis was closely connected to this organisation through interaction with its leaders at 
various forums, through a cooperation arrangement between NZ AVSEC and SATS 
Security Services of which he was General Manager and finally, his involvement as an 
independent industry advisor in a thrice-yearly audit of AVSEC.  Much of what is 
written here is based on this experience. 
 
4.2.6.1   Introduction 
In New Zealand all aviation security matters come under one organisation - The New 
Zealand Aviation Security Service (AVSEC). It is a government agency reporting, 
through a Board of Directors of the Civil Aviation Authority, to the Minister of 
Transport but has considerable independence in its operations and follows the 
corporatised model by being structured as a company on a user pay principle. It is 
almost entirely funded by third party revenue, namely fees paid by departing 
passengers. It has 361 staff located in eight locations. In 2002/03, its budget was 
approx. $24m.  AVSEC has just launched a new Strategic Plan and expects to have 
500 employees by late 2005. 
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AVSEC has a strong commitment to quality and was the first organisation of its type to 
achieve ISO 9002 certification. In 2000, it was awarded the inaugural SATS-Edith 
Cowan University award for excellence by an aviation security organisation and its 
General Manager, Mark Everitt won a merit award for Outstanding AVSEC Official. 
Everitt repeatedly emphasises what the US had always ignored, that the  ‘keys’ to the 
success of a quality aviation security organisation is emphasis on the human factor 
element through constant retraining and testing and quality management systems. This 
approach has put AVSEC in a very strong position after the events of 9/11 (Anderson 
2003). Everitt brought the right combination of Police experience and public relations 
to this unique organisation. He was a sworn Police Officer for 21 years spending eight 
years at Police National Headquarters.  He was responsible for the development of 
Intelligence Analysis, introducing computers to assist the management of serious crime 
investigations, and establishing the Police Helicopter Operations, becoming the first 
National Co-ordinator. 
 
4.2.6.2   Restructuring 
 
AVSEC is well known in New Zealand as a good and generous employer, with 
demonstrated commitment to staff in a range of areas including training and 
development, rewards and recognition and health and welfare. September 11, the Iraq 
war and the Bali bombing have had a major impact on AVSEC and in 2003 alone it 
has increased by 80% in size and budget. These changes have lead to a restructuring 
and the creation of a number of new positions reflecting the new demands of effective 
security expected of a government agency on the one hand and on the other hand, the 




4.2.6.3   Functions 
AVSEC is responsible for undertaking a set of duties listed in Section 80 of the New 
Zealand Civil Aviation Act 1990. Its key duties are:  The screening of departing 
international passengers and domestic passengers on 90+seat aircraft (and their 
baggage) for dangerous items, Access controls, Patrolling of security-designated areas 
and Searching of aircraft. 
 
AVSEC feels very strongly that an aviation security force must have a variety of 
functions for its personnel to prevent boredom and act as motivation. One of the 
problems in the US system was the division of tasks into very specialised mundane 
functions and the tendering out of these functions. It could not attract good employees. 
AVSEC sets out this philosophy in its handbook: 
Every effort should be made to make the scope of the aviation security officer’s 
work as wide as possible.  Their duties could include, in addition to screening, 
aircraft and terminal search, guard and access control, foot and mobile patrols 
and any other suitable duties.  The rotation of persons between several duties is a 
strong motivating factor for the following reasons: 
(a) It improves alertness by changing the outlook. 
      (b) It improves job satisfaction by introducing additional skills. 
      (c) It provides staff with a better overall view of security and where they 
fit into the system. 
      (d) It improves the well being of staff through changes in the working 
environment. 
It provides staff with a better self-image, resulting in better performance and 
greater respect from the public. 
 
4.2.6.4   Work with other agencies 
In the performance of its duties, the fact that it is a single government agency helps 
AVSEC work very closely with the border agencies (Customs and   Immigration) and 
the NZ Police. It also works closely with the airlines and airport companies. AVSEC 
has developed an extensive international network and is in regular contact with 
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international airlines and regulators, such as the US Transportation Security 
Administration. It frequently conducts training courses and consultancy in the South 
Pacific region and has also consulted for Malaysia. 
 
4.2.6.5   AVSEC Quality/Audit approach 
AVSEC is strongly committed to quality and its quality approach is demonstrated in a 
number of areas: strong customer focus, ongoing review of its systems, recurrent 
testing of all officers every 120 days in key functions, operation of work improvement 
teams at each station, extensive external and internal audit programme involving 
airlines and external regulators, regular customer satisfaction surveys with key clients 
and membership of the NZ Benchmarking Club. 
 
4.2.6.6   Rewards 
The fact that AVSEC is not subjected to a short contract or tender, means that it is able 
to retain good staff and build a reservoir of expertise and good relationships. Hence it 
has an emphasis on generous and competitive remuneration to all employees and 
recognising long service. This need is again emphasised in its handbook as follows       
Conditions of Service 
Because of the importance of the security process in aviation and the time taken 
for persons to become fully proficient in the functions, it is important that the 
conditions of service are sufficient to attract and retain suitable persons.  Salaries 
should be set at a level that will attract the right people and other conditions such 
as leave, health and safety programmes provided that will encourage them to see 
aviation security as a career rather than a short-term job.  
 
 
 The health and welfare of AVSEC staff is of great importance to them. As a 
government agency, AVSEC is subject to a statutory “good employer’‘ requirement, 
which encourages the development of strategies that enable them to meet 
organisational goals whilst being mindful of the welfare of employees.  
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4.2.6.7   Performance Management 
This is an area of ongoing activity for AVSEC. A performance management system 
consists of the following elements: 
Training and development: This is of particular importance and all employees have the 
opportunity to further their development through a combination of internal and 
external courses. At any time at least ten employees are doing tertiary studies in a 
variety of disciplines ranging from accounting to employee relations, to business 
communications. In addition, staff are encouraged to upgrade their computer skills.  
Internal communication: Internal communication is an important feature. Generally, all 
staff are expected to have a sound grasp of mission, values and goals and the role that 
they have to play in achieving those goals.  
 
4.2.6.8   Background 
What AVSEC is today in terms of its success and current organisational structure was 
not by chance but evolved as a result of detailed reviews and analyses going back to 
1986. It would be useful to review the thinking that went behind this so readers can 
grasp some of the fundamental principles involved in an aviation security regime. 
 
Up till 1986, Aviation Security in New Zealand was an entirely government matter. By 
virtue of the Civil Aviation Act, international civil aviation security was the 
responsibility of the Director of the Civil Aviation Department (CAD). This 
responsibility was exercised through an operational branch which carried out 
passenger checks at international airports. The Chief Controller of Aviation Security, 
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reporting to the Deputy Director, had a team of 2 in head office, 42 in Auckland, 16 in 
Wellington, 20 in Christchurch; a total staff of 80. 
 
In 1986, a comprehensive review was done in response to worldwide trends in policing 
and privatisation, recent changes in New Zealand government philosophy, the transfer 
of responsibilities from the State bodies to corporatised agencies, and the resultant 
changes in attitudes. Besides the government departments, airlines and airports also 
had to examine their expenditures and consider the potential effects of “user pays”. For 
aviation security, a basic philosophy of this review was that the aviation security 
authority should set, monitor and audit standards, but should not itself carry out 
operational functions. To be an operator means that CAD monitors itself; and the 
independence necessary for impartial monitoring was deemed to be at risk. 
 
Notwithstanding this philosophical standpoint, the CAD review reasoned that there 
must be good reason for changing an operation such as aviation security that was 
deemed to be functioning so very well: “ The aviation security branch is a close-knit 
and efficient unit. The Chief Controller of Aviation Security has instituted controls 
enabling him to monitor the regions and individuals in the region. All comments we 
(CAD) have received about the security branch, whether with respect to head office or 
regions, have been favourable”. 
 
There was no doubt therefore that aviation security was being successfully and 
efficiently delivered. The question in the minds of the reviewers was whether fewer 
resources would be required if the aviation security unit had a different organisational 
arrangement such as a corporatised body or a merger with the airport company. Their 
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terms of reference required them to see whether CAD security functions can be 
achieved with fewer resources, and to consider the implications of ‘user pays’. A 
complicating factor then was that the transfer of ownership of the airports, and the 
consequent transfer of responsibility for crash fire service to airports, led to subsequent 
industrial problems between crash fire staff and their employers, the Airways 
Corporation.  
 
The recommended option as a result of submissions from airlines and the international 
airports was that the present level of security could be achieved at less cost if it is 
integrated with airport operations. Aviation security and other incident or flight driven 
functions such as crash fire, place fluctuating demands on personnel resources, and this 
was very much so at the busier airports of Wellington and Christchurch. It was felt that 
airports could weave a number of duties and, to some extent, spread-out the workload 
for security personnel. 
 
In the end, for the sake of retaining strategic control through a state agency, the 
decision was to establish a corporatised agency and AVSEC was established and Mark 
Everitt appointed as its first General Manager in 1993. It has never looked back since, 
and it appeared to have been the right decision. 
 
4.2.7 Singapore: Policing after privatisation 
The author of this thesis was the General Manager, from 1992 to 2001, of SATS 
Security Services (SSS), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Singapore Airlines Group, 
that provides aviation and security services to the SIA Group and other organizations 
at Changi airport. This chapter is a personal perspective and also draws on the report 
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on SSS in the ILO publication, “Supporting Workplace Learning for High 
Performance Working”, edited by David Ashton and Johnny Sung (2002) of Leicester 
University. This was recognition by the ILO of SSS achievements. 
 
The management of aviation security in Singapore is shown in Figure 1. The overall 
responsibility for aviation security in Singapore comes under the Singapore Police 
Force (SPF). However, in the day-to-day management of operations, they have 
divested a considerable amount of work to Auxiliary Police Forces (APFs) set up 
exclusively for the airport. 
 
 These APFs are established by the Parliament of Singapore through gazettes. They are 
given full police powers within designated areas such as airports, seaports, armaments 
factories, sensitive installations, and theme parks. They are set up and managed by the 
owners or managers of these establishments. Some are private entities like Singapore 
Airlines; others are government organisations like the Port of Singapore Authority. In 
all cases, auxiliary police forces are only allowed for areas considered to be of national 
security interest. 
 
The SPF monitor these forces by setting minimum educational and other standards for 
recruitment; screening of candidates through their criminal records database; setting 
out minimum training requirements; setting qualifying exams and basic certification; 
sitting in on promotional boards; auditing activities, arms and equipment; and setting 
out requirements for types of arms. 
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The auxiliary police forces are free to set their own compensation and benefits 
package; do their own recruitment; conduct training beyond basic; and make their own 
purchases of equipment. In Changi Airport, there are two auxiliary police forces for 
airlines to choose from, which introduces an element of competition. SSS is one of 
them with 80% of the market share and the other is Changi International Airport 
Services (CIAS), originally a joint venture between the Port of Singapore Authority 
and seven foreign airlines and now bought over by DNATA, a subsidiary of Emirates 
Airlines. The commercial wing of the Singapore Police Force, CISCO, is also allowed 
to bid for airport security tenders but has not done so for some time because of a focus 
on their core work. 
 
SSS was set up by Singapore Airlines in 1969 as an Airport Auxiliary Police Force, 
primarily to serve the security needs of Singapore Airlines and foreign airlines 
operating into Singapore who use the ground handling services of Singapore Airlines. 
In 1989, it was restructured as a separate wholly owned subsidiary company of 
Singapore Airlines. This allows SSS to offer services beyond that of an Auxiliary 
Police Force such as in training and consultancy not only in Singapore but also to the 
region (Aviation Security International 2004).  
 
Ashton (2002) recognised that while SSS provides a full range of security services for 
airports, it faces a different set of constraints than most commercial concerns, in that it 
has not only to compete in the market, but as an auxiliary police force it also faces a 
number of legal obligations and constraints which cover its activities. It is regulated by 
the SPF and is therefore subject to a set of strict accountability rules and constraints on 
a wide range of issues such as standards of firearms performance, promotional criteria, 
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and physical fitness, in addition to those which stem from the market. The 
requirements for effective policing may at times conflict with strict commercial cost-
control considerations and SSS has to constantly balance the profit and policing 
criteria. Another distinctive feature of SSS activities that Ashton noted was that 
because “it is competing in terms of community criteria, e.g. reducing bomb threats, 
threats to public security and crime reduction, it is not always in competition against 
other providers and therefore can cooperate with agencies in other countries and in 
Singapore, e.g. CIAS, in joint operations and in sharing ways of improving security.” 
 
Ashton also noted “SSS was suffering from low morale, low motivation and poor 
levels of service performance when Mr. Kandiah was appointed in 1992. The aim of 
his changes was to introduce higher levels of service and professionalism into the 
company. The focus was twofold: to generate higher levels of customer satisfaction 
and to improve the "company product", i.e. the security guard”. What he saw done in 
SSS was similar to the experiences in other aviation security agencies in Hong Kong, 
New Zealand and Australia – the painful transition from police to service:  
“When Mr. Kandiah took charge of SSS, training was often thought of in a 
negative way by hard-pressed police commanders, taking people away from 
operations, making arrangements for coverage, and incurring additional costs. 
The problem facing him was how to change the police commanders' mindsets. 
His solution was to introduce business concepts into police management and to 
see a police officer and his actions as a product and training as product 
development”.  
 
Once SSS took this approach, its people were able to see why it is important not just to 
look at police training but at all processes that affect a police officer's performance 
including areas that are traditionally not thought of as an organization's concern, such 
as a police officer's physical and medical fitness, his communication skills, his 
contribution to the community beyond mere policing and his long-term development. 
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While it appears altruistic, it is a very hard-nosed, practical approach to improving 
police officer performance and hence the organization's effectiveness.  In this respect, 
the investment in training is seen as the equivalent of a manufacturer investing in 
research and development. Performance in the service sector requires the full 
utilization of human potential. Such an approach was necessary to reconcile the 
demands of security and facilitation. 
 
Private policing works in Singapore because of: 
State direction over policies: There is overall policy direction from the State, which 
provides impartiality and legal clout in implementation. The State Police chair the 
airport security committee and set out minimum and recommended security 
procedures. The State has also clearly stated that aviation is a strategic industry and 
that the state will continue to have a controlling stake (Lim 2002). 
State control over quality: This is through minimum recruitment and training 
requirements and audits. All APF officers have to pass exams set by the Police 
Academy. The high standards mean that only good quality officers can pass, requiring 
the APFs to increase salaries to recruit the right quality. 
Some freedom for APFs: This is in the areas of compensation, continuation training, 
purchasing and technical improvements. 
Greater accountability for the costs of security: Since airlines have to pay for the 
security they want, there is a check on requests for unnecessary or excessive security 
which could happen in situations where security is provided free by the State. 
Flexibility on having different security arrangements for different clients: The  
fact that different airlines have different threats allows a private police force to  
implement different security arrangements within the same airport on the basis of  
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client requirements. A state police force may not be able to so easily discriminate and  
differentiate. 
 
There are of course drawbacks. A major problem has been their own employees, who 
in their enthusiasm to service their clients, may sacrifice national interests without 
realising it. A case study of an actual incident is as follows:  
“A Nigerian passenger purchased duty-free items, on board an aircraft, with forged 
credit cards. He was detected by the airline’s cabin crew who alerted their officials at 
the destination to have security personnel to meet and arrest. On arrival of the aircraft, 
auxiliary police personnel arrested the passenger. The Airline Manager seized the 
credit card, got the passenger to return the items, and asked auxiliary police personnel 
to release the passenger without referral to the State Police, to avoid costs of detention, 
trial and deportation. (The practice in Singapore is for the authorities to make the 
airline bear the costs of criminal proceedings and deportation as a deterrent against 
airlines not doing enough to check or screen passengers before they board at the 
originating station). 
The auxiliary police personnel acceded to this client’s request to maintain the cordial 
commercial relationship. The passenger cleared through immigration and disappeared 
into the city. The implications are that the passenger will continue crime in the city and 
he will try cheating other airlines.  
The APF officers should have persuaded the airline to report and if they do not agree, 
then invoke police powers and responsibilities and hand-over the passenger to the State 
Police. At the same time, to assuage the feelings of their client and to ensure good faith 
for the future similar incidences, they should waive charges for work involved for 
liaison with State Police”. 
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SSS briefed all airline clients on this case and got their agreement on what ought to be 
done for future cases which is that for the sake of the nation, the industry and even 
their own airline, they must report all such cases. They also counselled all personnel on 
the importance of invoking state interests when there is a conflict, and to be unafraid of 
denying client requests.  
 
So far, this system has been working well in Singapore’s Changi Airport. They have 
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4.2.8    Sri Lanka: A siege response 
Sri Lanka, also a former British colony, had similar arrangements as the UK and its 
other former colonies like Malaysia. It too wanted to follow the UK’s lead in 
privatising its aviation sector, but proceeded at a slower rate because of the civil war. 
The airports are still government owned and run and the airline is majority-owned by 
the government but with management under the control of a foreign airline, Emirates 
Airlines of the United Arab Emirates. The laws were amended to allow for the airport 
to become a corporate entity but the pace of change has been slow (Tiruchelvam 
2001). 
 
A major difference in Sri Lanka’s case is that it is a front line state in the war against 
terror, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam often targeting aviation to cripple the 
economy. Sri Lanka’s aviation   security arrangements are therefore on a constant war 
footing, like that of Israel. Like Israel, it did not matter if the airline or other aviation 
organisations were in private hands. All have risen to the challenge by rigorous 
application of procedures and standards. 
 
Sri Lanka is a good example of a nation with little financial resources and hence an 
inability to rely on technological means of defence but which met the challenge 
through effective procedural reviews and rigorous training. Its Airport Security Force 
and its entire security arrangements, with a good balance of security and service, won a 
Merit Award at the Asia –Pacific AVSEC Awards in 2000. It was able to do this even 
though the airline’s security force was a private security force. 
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In that sense, Sri Lanka has the right combination of state control and coordination at 
the highest levels with a semi-autonomous force and a private airline security force at 
the operational levels. The airline force is committed to maintaining a good balance 
between security and service and makes sure that the processes that ensure this, such as 







































USA Total State Gov Agency Poor High Poor 
UK Only for 
strategy 
Private Mixed Good High High 
Australia Total State Gov-owned 
Corp 
Excellent Moderate High 
Hong Kong Total State Gov-owned 
Corp 
Excellent Low High 
India Total State Gov Agency Very Poor High Moderate 
Israel Only for 
strategy 
Private Mixed  Average Very high High 
Malaysia Total State Gov-owned 
Corp 
Average Low Poor 
New 
Zealand 
Total State Gov-owned 
Corp 
Excellent Low High 




Excellent Moderate High 
Sri Lanka Total State Gov-owned 
Corp 









                                                 
 117 
                                               CHAPTER FIVE 
                                     THE FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 
5.1 Objective. 
This chapter gleans the factors for the successful operation of aviation security units, 
based on the historical experience, industry perception and the actual performance of 
the better units.  
5.2 The ideal model  
The ideal model for the management of aviation security seems to be what I would call 
‘strategic corporatisation’ – not as an interim phase towards complete privatisation 
but as an end in itself, to combine the best of state control and private sector 
performance. This calls for the State to set out policy and conduct monitoring while the 
operational delivery of security services is farmed out to a state owned but independent 
agency operating on a user-pay principle.  
 
This appears the best way to reconcile the contradictory pulls, in the aviation industry, 
of security and service. The best organisations – Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia,  
– appear to follow this model and consistently gain recognition for outstanding 
performance. Their governments worry about the larger issues and costs while the 
organisations   are given the independence to focus on and seek their own solutions to 
operational issues. 
 
In Europe, these are referred to as “public autonomous companies” – public in 
ownership and overall control, strategy and funding but independent and business like 
in operational issues (Esler 2004). In Singapore and elsewhere, there is reference (Teo 
2004) to Public Private Partnership (PPP) initiatives.  Teo highlights the fact that 
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PPPs are not new to the world and are well developed in Europe. This model is used 
for many services perceived as existing for the public good or are inherently 
governmental functions, such as air traffic services, management of airports, criminal 
justice services, etc. But it is particularly suitable for aviation security, because of the 
larger threats against the industry, the need for coordination internally and 
internationally, the complex task of defending aviation and the fact that cross-subsidies 
for smaller airports and airlines are needed as aviation, more than in any other 
industry, is only as strong as its weakest link. 
 
The most important factor in this study is that government must be involved in the 
control and coordination of aviation security. States that ignore this do so at their own 
peril, as the US has discovered at the cost of so many lives. The more efficient 
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, UK, Israel, always had a single 
national agency actively involved in and enforcing the rules. The US FAA was a 
federal agency but it did not have law enforcement powers or access to intelligence. It 
also allowed too much decentralisation in the enforcement of minimum standards. 
 
The second principle is that there must be one coordinating agency for the country, 
regardless of its size. Private organisations do not have the clout to do this well. The 
complex nature of aviation, its borderless challenges and the need to coordinate with 
ICAO make coordination by a single legally empowered national agency a key need. 
 
The third principle is that there must be a separation between regulatory and 
operational functions. The mistake the US is making is having both in one agency and 
this can lead to the old problem of glossing over gaps, defensiveness and conflict of 
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priorities. New Zealand had a very efficient Civil Aviation Department that did both 
functions well but still saw the need to separate the two. Similarly, Australia saw a 
need to transform its totally state-managed Australian Protective Service to one that is 
more commercially driven. Israel, despite the highest of threats, never saw the need to 
nationalise private security bodies but instead focussing on measures to transform 
them, such as training standards, subsidies and monitoring. 
 
A fourth principle is commitment, which actually, underpins everything else. When 
there is commitment, both state and private organisations do well.  Israel and Sri Lanka 
did well with a combination of regimes. Malaysia does not seem to be doing as well 
despite having good systems and in Singapore, state-owned agencies seem to be 
outperforming private organisations. A major problem in the US has been the malaise 
of “drift” and one wonders if September 11 has finally changed that.  
 
A fifth principle is the need for variety in assignments, for management and 
employees, because of the inherently boring nature of security tasks. The New 
Zealanders make this a key element of their deployment and training strategies, as do 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia. They do patrols, document checks, close-circuit 
television monitoring, guarding of parked aircraft, escort duty, cargo screening, checks 
of catering trucks and almost the full range of security in an airport.  The US TSA, 
however, has its employees performing the very tedious and specialised job of 
passenger screening at the gates. The industry view is that tedium will kill alertness 




5.3 Performance of private bodies. 
Overall, at the operational level, however, it appears that private or semi-private 
organisations do better in performance and results for the following reasons: 
Greater accountability for the costs of security: Since airlines have to pay for the 
security they want, there is a check on requests for unnecessary or excessive security 
which could happen in situations where security is provided free by the State. 
             Flexibility in having different security arrangements for different clients: The fact that 
different airlines have different threats allows a private police force to implement 
different security arrangements within the same airport on the basis of client 
requirements. A state police force may not be able to so easily discriminate and 
differentiate or even have the legal clout to charge differently. SATS Security, 
AVSECO, NZ AVSEC and APS are all able to charge airlines for additional services. 
The US TSA is still grappling with this issue. 
Better focus and priorities: While the State concentrates on the more important issues 
of policy and long-term strategy, the operational and privatised units take over the 
burden of day-to-day management of operations, human resource management, 
recruitment and equipment evaluation and purchase without the constraints of state 
bureaucracies. The aviation security organisations in Singapore, New Zealand and 
Hong Kong were able to innovate in operations ahead of the state and their 
governments were able to innovate in policies that saw them play a leading role in 
deliberations at the ICAO level. 
Competitive element: The competitive element also leads to improvements in service 
standards and quality, but must be tempered by limits to the number of competitors. 
This means that there is no unbridled competition that can result in lower profit 
margins and hence quality. Singapore Airport retained the competitive element but did 
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not fall into the classic trap that many private US security companies suffered from, 
whereby competitive squeezes on margins led to lower salaries and lower quality of 
recruits. 
Improved career options: Freedom in salary, deployment and training policy has 
enabled semi or private forces to be attractive career options as in the example of New 
Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. The ability to recruit better quality personnel 
makes an immediate impact on security standards. 
Quick response to market trends: Freedom from government bureaucracies allows 
them to respond quickly to market trends in equipment, operational management and 
service standards. After September 11, while it took months for the US TSA to bring in 
new technology, SSS, AVSECO and NZ AVSEC were able to do it in days. The UK’s 
corporatised Manchester Airport was the first in the world to introduce centralised, 
fully automated screening that is now becoming the norm at major airports. 
Innovations: The most outstanding aviation security organisations, as perceived by the 
industry through awards, have been semi-private organisations like those from 
Singapore, Hong Kong and New Zealand. Their independence has enabled them to be 
innovators. SSS, for example, had been able to be ahead of the State Police in the 
acquisition of the world’s most advanced computer-based training system for x-ray 
screeners (SAFE PASSAGE); the acquisition of a computer-based psychological 
assessment system (QUEST); extensive automation and computerisation of operations; 
and training with leading edge institutions all over the world. Hong Kong is a startling 





5.4   Problems with private policing 
Private policing is, of course, not without its problems: 
Public perception: Not all members of the public perceive them as police, and there 
have been some challenges to their authority. These, however, are not frequent and the 
State Police can back them up by handling such cases firmly and educating the 
recalcitrant ones on the legitimacy of their powers. 
Conflict between interest of client and state: Commercial organisations are beholden to 
their employing authority and to the clients they serve, such as airlines. At the same 
time, they are also an arm of the State, having powers vested in them by the State. 
Sometimes, the interests of these parties do not coincide and it may be necessary to 
choose. 
The guiding principle has always been that state interests come first, and in the few 
instances where these organisations had to invoke these powers in favour of the state, 
they had not lost a client. Generally, clients understand the need for the right kind of 
priorities. 
Confusion for employees: The greater problem has been their own employees, who in 
their enthusiasm to service their own clients may sacrifice national interests without 
realising it. This can only be reconciled through constant briefings and education. 
Pressure on commercial relationships: Commercial relationships, in the long run, can 
succumb to familiarity, the pressure to take short cuts, to waive the rules, etc. It is not 
easy to enter into a commercial relationship and then behave uncommercially. SSS had 
encountered several incidents that illustrate this issue. The privatised screening 
companies in the US are a good example of this process and had been slapped with 
numerous fines by the FAA. 
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Conflict between advice and marketing:  Security advice can often be misconstrued as 
commercial marketing. This would of course depend on one’s track record. If they are 
often seen to give advice that is against their own commercial interests, then their 
credibility is established. One way that SSS tries to get around this problem is to send 
advice to the State Police, who if they agree, can send it out as an impartial directive. 
Conflict of organisational and management styles: A state-owned or backed security 
force has to be run in the classic military model of very centralised decision-making, 
highly hierarchical layers, tight control and strict discipline. At the same time, it has to 
function as a commercial organisation, with quick response to market trends in 
equipment, procedures, rates and flexibility in relationships with clients, and 
implementation of services. This is not easy to reconcile but measures would include 
proper training, decentralised operations, empowerment, constant visits to clients and 
customer service units manned by non-police personnel. 
 
The Australian experience showed that the issue of police mindsets in a service 
environment is a very real problem. It went through some trauma in changing such 
mindsets and it is quite clear that it would not have been able to do this without 
transforming its organisational structure from a public one to something closer to a 
private agency with accountability to its clients. 
 
Overall, not only are there are some clear factors that characterise the better units but 
these appear to be universally applicable across countries, aviation systems and 
political and economic structures. With the right level of commitment and a rigorous 
study of the right mix should allow any country to have a reasonable defence against 
those who wish to attack their aviation systems. 
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                                                                              CHAPTER SIX 
                                             CONCLUSION 
The excesses of extreme privatisation on the one hand and total state involvement on 
the other have clearly shown that for the aviation security industry, more than in any 
other, the solution lies somewhere in the middle – a public-private initiative that 
combines the best of both. 
 
The excesses of extreme privatisation have already shown up and are being researched 
and documented in many examples in the UK (such as British Rail). In aviation 
security, the classic case is, of course, the pre-September 11 system in the US, with its 
downward spiral of bids and quality. The extremes of state involvement have also been 
discredited in the service performance of state aviation security agencies in India. The 
last few years have seen the remarkable successes of PPP arrangements in France. 
Singapore, for a long time, has actually been adopting a PPP model in almost all 
sectors but particularly in aviation. The government owns huge chunks of strategic 
industries such as the national airline, two airports and a number of aerospace 
companies but gives sufficient independence to its leaders to run them like private 
corporations.  
 
In aviation security, the ideal model would have one national or federal body that 
retains state control and direction over standards and policies, coordination with other 
governments, ICAO, and with other national agencies, would separate regulatory 
functions from operational duties and divest these operational duties to a single, 
separate, government controlled but independent agency with adequate law-
enforcement powers and commercial independence. It will offer a variety of functions 
 125 
to its management and employees, use international benchmarks to measure 
performance and price, coordinate internationally with non-government organisations, 
operate on a user-pay principle, measure and integrate service levels with other 
aviation agencies by having the right rewards system and flexible labour rules and pay 
rigorous attention to training and testing. 
 
The potential problem that the Americans seem to be having is to combine regulatory 
and operational functions in one federal agency. In the long run, they can run into 
union problems, slow decision making, unresponsiveness, etc - all the characteristic 
sins of state agencies as can be seen in the Indian model. Nevertheless the Americans 
have come a long way in at least and at last, having a single federal agency with law 
enforcement powers. What they need to do now is to establish a separate government-
owned or funded but autonomous security force to take over the operational functions. 
The employees must not have federal union protection so that management has the 
freedom to hire and fire on the basis of performance. The management must have more 
freedom to be more commercial in its client relations, be a partner with other airport 
agencies in service delivery to keep travel a pleasant experience and be more 
innovative in the acquisition of technology. There is also a need to expand the range of 
functions of the TSA so that both management and employees are delivered from the 
tedium of specialisation and motivated by variety. 
 
Similarly, countries like India and those with similar systems like in China, Pakistan, 
Russia, East Europe etc should have a separate body to handle operations and then to 
get them to focus on service issues and financial efficiency. It would require changes 
to legislation, such as the ability to charge for services, changes to organisational 
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structure and greater independence to respond to clients and service demands. This 
separate body need not be a private entity but can be run or owned by the government 
like those in Hong Kong, New Zealand and Australia. The choice of leader is a critical 
issue and he or she must be sufficiently empowered. 
 
For Singapore, the overall state control and involvement is very good, with the State 
Police having tight controls on local standards and actively coordinating on 
international matters. However, at the operational level, it has a unique arrangement of 
allowing two Auxiliary Police Forces to compete. There is an on-going debate on 
whether to merge them into one aviation security force like in Hong Kong, New 
Zealand and Australia. While the airlines and others who buy services from these 
forces prefer this arrangement as a check on rates and service quality, the authorities 
would prefer one agency. There would be savings on overheads and better control and 
coordination. The State has not pushed this too vigorously because of resistance from 
foreign airlines and the preference by Singapore Airlines to continue with its own 
security force so as to keep costs and quality under control. However, eventually, I see 
the state pushing for a single auxiliary police force for Changi Airport. The 
competitive element can be retained through benchmarking processes such as those 
done by Hong Kong and New Zealand and there will be no conflict of interest between 
loyalties to the state and to commercial owners. 
 
Overall, the trend throughout the world will be to move towards the proven PPP model 
for aviation security forces and services. This is not only because the PPP model 
appears well suited for certain types of functions that need state direction but also 
because of the unique situation of the aviation industry that requires such an approach 
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more than in any other sector. Its impact on national economies, its varied and multi-
faceted nature, the wide range of stake-holders, its increasing commercialisation, its 
emphasis on speed and the pleasures of travel, its status as a prime target of terrorists 
and the consequent heavy government involvement, all demand a joint public-private 
approach that will harness the different strengths of each - the state to provide strategic 
direction and control, help with costs, intervene in extreme situations while the private 
sectors focuses on efficiencies in service, operations and finance. If the framework is 
sound and well enforced, PPPs will combine the best of government planning with the 
discipline and rigour that market forces bring. A truly win-win solution that can only 
do good for the worldwide war on terror. 
 
The actual formula or structure will, of course, be adapted to local needs and 
requirements, depending on the local laws, the state of aviation development and 
infrastructure and the standards of policing and security. There is, however, sufficient 
legislative precedence and operational experience and testing of this model in a wide 
variety of cultures and situations that can serve as a guide to countries or organisations 
wanting to move in this direction – developed economies such as New Zealand and 
Australia, developing ones like Hong Kong and Singapore, lesser developing ones like 
Sri Lanka and countries under constant siege such as Israel.  
 
A major limitation in this study is that because aviation security units are in the 
forefront of the war on terror, much useful information is classified or not available to 
the public – information on detections, structure, security arrangements, staffing levels, 




Future research on this issue can therefore focus on the performance of these 
organisations, looking at financial, operational, and organisational performance and 
compare them with totally government run regimes. The focus must not only be on 
security but how they balance this with service or facilitation. Since many of these 
organisations appear to have succeeded because of or be transformed by strong leaders, 
it may be useful to also study leadership profiles to determine if there is a special 
profile of the kind of leaders these organisations need. Another area of concern is 
organisational structure, whether it would be best to have police-style hierarchies or 
flatter service type organisations. Related to this is the question as to what type would 
make the best aviation security officer – ex-military and police types given service 
training or service types given security training. 
 
In conclusion, there is a pressing need to pay attention to the issue of aviation security 
and the manner in which it is delivered, both because of the continued expansion of the 
industry and the continued threats against it by terrorists. I hope this thesis has helped 
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A.      INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION 
ANNEX 17 - SECURITY. (ED6/97) 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS 
Air side. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions 
thereof, access to which is controlled. 
Regulated Agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts 
business with an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required 
by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail. 
Note: The term "Known shipper" has been amended to "Regulated Agent" to take into 
account the different security controls applied to originators of cargo and those entities 
that consolidate and forward cargo shipments via an air carrier. 
Screening. The application of technical or other means which are intended to detect 
weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act 
of unlawful interference. 
Security. A combination of measures and human and material resources intended to 
safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. 
Security Control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or 
articles likely to be utilized to commit an act of unlawful interference can be 
prevented. 
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Security Programme. Measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation 
against acts of unlawful interference. 
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL 
2.1 Aims and objectives 
 2.1.1 The aim of aviation security shall be to safeguard international civil 
aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference. 
 2.1.2 Safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public shall 
be the primary objective of each Contracting State in all matters related to 
safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with international civil 
aviation. 
2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization, develop plans and 
implement procedures, which together provide a standardized level of 
security for the operation of international flights in normal operating 
conditions and which are capable of rapid expansion to meet any 
increased security threat. 
2.2 Security and facilitation 
2.2.1 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should whenever possible 
arrange for the security measures and procedures to cause a minimum of 
interference with, or delay to the activities of, international civil aviation. 
2.2.2 Note: Guidance material on achieving international civil aviation security 
objectives through application of the Standards and Recommended 
Practices in the following chapters is to be found in the Security Manual 
for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference 
(Doc 8973). 
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CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION 
3.1 National organization 
 3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish a national civil aviation security 
programme. 
 3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the objective of their national 
civil aviation security programme shall be to safeguard international civil 
aviation operations against acts of unlawful interference, through 
regulations, practices and procedures which take account of the safety, 
regularity and efficiency of flights. 
 3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall designate an appropriate authority within its 
administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and 
maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme. 
 3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall specify to ICAO the appropriate authority 
designated under 3.1.3. 
 3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level of 
threat within its territory taking into account the international situation 
and adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security 
programme accordingly. 
 3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to establish 
means of co-ordinating activities between the departments, agencies and 
other organizations of the State concerned with or responsible for various 
aspects of the national civil aviation security programme. 
 3.1.7 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define 
and allocate the tasks for implementation of the national civil aviation 
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security programme as between agencies of the State, airport 
administrations, operators and others concerned. 
 3.1.8  Each Contracting State shall ensure the establishment of an airport 
security programme, adequate to the needs of international traffic, for 
each airport serving international civil aviation. 
 3.1.9 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should make available to its 
airport administrations, airlines operating in its territory and others 
concerned, a written version of the appropriate parts of its national civil 
aviation security programme. 
 3.1.10 Each Contracting State shall arrange for an authority at each airport 
serving international civil aviation to be responsible for co-ordinating the 
implementation of security measures. 
 3.1.11 Each Contracting State shall arrange for the establishment of airport 
security committees to advise on the development and co-ordination of 
security measures and procedures at each airport serving international 
civil aviation. 
 3.1.12 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should ensure that 
arrangements are made for the investigation of suspected sabotage 
devices or other potential ha7ards at airports serving international civil 
aviation and for their disposal 
 3.1.13 Each Contracting State shall ensure that duly authorized and suitably 
trained officers are readily available for deployment at their airports 
serving international civil aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or 
actual, cases of unlawful interference with international civil aviation. 
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 3.1.14 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the appropriate authority 
arranges for the supporting facilities required by the security services at 
each airport serving international civil aviation. 
 3.1.15 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are developed 
and resources made available to safeguard airports and ground facilities 
used in international civil aviation, against acts of unlawful interference. 
 3.1.16 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure 
the development and implementation of training programmes to ensure 
the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security programme. 
 3.1.17 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should ensure that persons 
engaged to implement security controls are subject to pre-employment 
checks, are capable of fulfilling their duties and are adequately trained. 
 3.1.18 Each Contracting State shall require operators providing service from that 
State to implement a security programme appropriate to meet the 
requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that 
State. 
 3.1.19 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should promote whenever 
possible research and development of new security equipment which will 
better satisfy international civil aviation security objectives. 
3.2 International co-operation 
 3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall co-operate with other States in order to adapt 
their respective national civil aviation security programmes as necessary. 
  3.2.1.1 Recommendation: Each Contracting Stage should make 
available to other States on request a written version of the 
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appropriate parts of its national civil aviation security 
programme. 
  3.2.1.2 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should include in its 
bilateral agreements on air transport a clause related to aviation 
security. 
 3.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other States for 
special security measures in respect of a specific flight or specified flights 
by operators of such other States, as far as may be practicable, are met. 
 3.2.3 Contracting States shall, as necessary, co-operate with each other in the 
development and exchange of information concerning training 
programmes. 
 3.2.4 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should co-operate with other 
States in the field of research and development of new security equipment 
which will better satisfy international civil aviation security objectives. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES 
4.1 General objectives of the measures 
 4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons, 
explosives or any other dangerous devices which may be used to commit 
an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not 
authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board 
an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation. 
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 Note: In applying this Standard, special attention must be paid to the threat 
posed by explosive devices concealed in, or using electric, electronic or 
battery-operated items carried as hand baggage and/or in checked 
baggage. Guidance on this matter is to be found in the Security Manual 
for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference 
(Doc 8973). 
 4.1.2 Recommendation: Contracting States should ensure that the carriage of 
weapons on board aircraft, by law enforcement officers and other 
authorized persons, acting in the performance of their duties, requires 
special authorization in accordance with the laws of the States involved. 
 4.1.2.1 Recommendation: Contracting States should ensure that the 
carriage of weapons in other cases is allowed only when an 
authorized and duly qualified person has determined that they 
are not loaded, inapplicable, and then only if stowed in a place 
inaccessible to any person during flight time. 
 4.1.2.2 Recommendation: Contracting States should ensure that the 
pilot-in-command is notified as to the number of armed 
persons and their seat location. 
 4.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that preflight checks of originating 
aircraft assigned to international flights include measures to discover 
suspicious objects or anomalies that could conceal weapons, explosives 
or any other dangerous devices. 
 4.1.4 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures, which include 
notification to the operator, for inspecting aircraft, when a well-founded 
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suspicion exists that the aircraft may be the object of an act of unlawful 
interference, for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous 
devices. 
 4.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to safeguard aircraft 
when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aircraft may be attacked 
while on the ground and to provide as much prior notification as possible 
of the arrival of such aircraft to airport authorities. 
 4.1.6 Each Contracting State shall arrange for surveys to identify security 
needs, arrange for inspections of the implementation of security controls, 
and arrange tests of security controls to assess their effectiveness. 
4.2 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage 
 4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that adequate measures are taken to 
control transfer and transit passengers and their cabin baggage to prevent 
unauthorized articles from being taken on board aircraft engaged in 
international civil aviation operations. 
 4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that there is no possibility of mixing 
or contact between passengers subjected to security control and other 
persons not subjected to such control after the security screening points at 
airports serving international civil aviation have been passed; if mixing or 
contact does take place, the passengers concerned and their cabin 
baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft. 
 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that the aircraft 
operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when passengers are 
obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or 
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administrative proceedings, in order that appropriate security measures 
can be taken. 
 4.2.4 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should require operators 
providing service from that State, to include in their security 
programmes, measures and procedures to ensure safety on board their 
aircraft when passengers are to be carried who are obliged to travel 
because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative 
proceedings. 
 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall require measures to taken in respect of 
flights under an increased threat to ensure that disembarking passengers 
do not leave items on board the aircraft at transit stops on its airports. 
4.3    Measures relating to checked baggage, cargo and other goods 
 4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that operators 
when providing service from that State do not transport the baggage of 
passengers who are not on board the aircraft unless the baggage separated 
from passengers is subjected to other security control measures. 
 4.3.2 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should establish measures to 
ensure that operators when providing a service from that State transport 
only baggage which is authorized for carriage. 
 4.3.3 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should establish measures to 
ensure that checked baggage is subjected to screening before being 
placed on board aircraft. 
 4.3.4 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
consignments checked-in as baggage by couriers for carriage on 
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passenger flights are subjected to specific security controls in addition to 
those provided in 4.3.1. 
 4.3.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that baggage 
intended for carriage on passenger flights and originating from places 
other than airport check-in counters is protected from the point it is 
checked in until it is placed on board an aircraft. 
 4.3.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure the implementation of measures at 
airports serving international civil aviation to protect cargo, baggage, 
mail, stores and operators' supplies being moved within an airport and 
intended for carriage on an aircraft to safeguard such aircraft against an 
act of unlawful interference. 
 4.3.7 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should establish measures to 
ensure that catering supplies and operators' stores and supplies intended 
for carriage on passenger flights are subjected to security controls. 
 4.3.8 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that cargo, 
courier and express parcels and mail intended for carriage on passenger 
flights are subjected to appropriate security controls. 
 4.3.9 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that operators 
do not accept consignments of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail 
for carriage on passenger flights unless the security of such consignments 
is accounted for by a regulated agent or such consignments are subjected 
to other security controls to meet the requirements of 4.3.8. 
 4.3.10 Each Contracting State shall require the establishment of secure storage 
areas at airports serving international civil aviation, where mishandled 
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baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or disposed of in 
accordance with local laws. 
 4.3.11 Recommendation: Each Contracting State should take the necessary 
measures to ensure that unidentified baggage is placed in a protected and 
isolated area until such time as it is ascertained that it does not contain 
any explosives or other dangerous device. 
4.4 Measures relating to access control 
 4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures and identification 
systems to prevent unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to: 
  a) the air side of an airport serving international civil aviation; and 
  b) other areas important to the security of the airport. 
 4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure adequate 
supervision over the movement of persons to and from the aircraft and to 
prevent unauthorised access to aircraft. 
4.5 Measures relating to airport design 
 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the architectural and infrastructure-
related requirements necessary for the optimum implementation of international 
civil aviation security measures, are integrated into the design and construction 






B.      DEFINITION OF AVIATION SECURITY 
Aviation Security can be defined as arrangements or systems to prevent acts of 
unlawful interference with civil aviation, and has as its aim: safety of passengers, crew, 
ground personnel and the general public shall be the primary consideration in all 
matters relating to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with international 
civil aviation. 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Security Manual, Doc 89/3/5- 
Chapter 1, defines aviation security as:“Acts of Unlawful Interference. An act of: 
a) violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to 
endanger the safety of that aircraft; 
b) destroying an aircraft in service or causing damage to such an aircraft which 
renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; 
c) placing or causing to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or 
causing damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or causing damage to 
it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; 
d) destroying or damaging air navigation facilities or interfering with their 
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; 
e) communicating information which is known to be false, thereby endangering 
the safety of an aircraft in flight; or 
f) unlawfully and intentionally using any device, substance or weapon: 
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1) performing an act of violence against a person at an airport serving 
international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious 
injury or death; 
2) destroying or seriously damaging the facilities of an airport serving 
international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or 
disrupting the services of the airport; if any such act endangers or is 
likely to endanger safety at that airport.” 
“Weapon” means: 
(a) a firearm of any kind; or 
(b) except for the absence of, or a defect in, a part of the device, would be a weapon 
of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a) ; or 
(c) is reasonably capable of being converted into a weapon of a kind mentioned in 











C.       BACKGROUND ON AVIATION SECURITY 
Attacks on aviation 
Gary Elphinstone and Keith Hancock(1993) highlight the fact that the safeguarding of 
civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference has been a matter of grave concern 
to governments and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 1968: 
“Such acts continue to have a serious world-wide detrimental effect on civil aviation 
operations and, despite the establishment by ICAO of international legal provisions 
and technical standards, coupled with the efforts of States and airlines, acts of unlawful 
interference continue to take place…The cost of these acts in terms of human lives, 
disruption to air services and adverse economic impact, is incalculable. Acts of 
unlawful interference diminish the capability of the civil aviation system whenever 
such occur, and the strength of the system to resist these acts calls for system-wide 
vigilance and the enhancement of security measures.” 
Hijacking 
Hijacking, as defined by ICAO, is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft during flight or 
whilst it is on the ground, usually by the use of force. The primary intention is usually 
over the media attention to a particular cause as incidents are given wide publicity 
when human life is used for negotiation. 
Elphinstone and Hancock write that “Hijacks have been carried out by individuals 
whose motivation stems from personal, criminal or political reasons or by groups who 
are members of a politically motivated terrorist organisation. These groups are likely to 
have considerable resources and to have received special training… Although there has 
been a significant reduction in hijackings since 1969, each year continues to see a 
number of civil aircraft being hijacked…The usual hijack technique is to secrete 
weapons or explosives on board an aircraft where they will be accessible for use when 
the attack is mounted. Some of the methods used to smuggle such items on to the 
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aircraft have included concealment on a person or in the hand baggage of a hijacker 
posing as a passenger. Alternatively, the items have been concealed in aircraft stores 
such as catering items, which have been subsequently loaded into the cabin area. 
Unfortunately, airport staff have been used as accomplices in previous incidents to 
conceal the weapons on the aircraft, ready for use by hijackers who subsequently board 
as passengers”. 
Sabotage of aircraft 
Elphinstone and Hancock define aircraft sabotage techniques as those that “have 
included the introduction of a device on to an aircraft by concealing the device in 
baggage, cargo or stores due to be loaded on to the aircraft and in the past airport staff 
have been recruited, or coerced, by the terrorists to assist in placing the 
device…Unsupervised baggage and stores waiting to be loaded on to an aircraft have 
always been especially vulnerable to the introduction of such an explosive 
device…Other techniques have included incidents where innocent passengers have 
been deceived into accepting apparently innocent items for inclusion in their baggage. 
Terrorists, in the guise of passengers, have also used other methods to infiltrate devices 
onto aircraft including checking in an item of hold baggage for a specific flight and 
subsequently not boarding the flight or consigning an item of baggage to an end route 
destination and leaving the aircraft at a transit stop before the device is timed to 
detonate…This form of attack has the advantage for the terrorist that, if successful, a 
large aircraft can be destroyed with a low probability of the attackers being detected.” 
Casualties can be very  high such as  the Lockerbie disaster  in December 1988 (269 




September 11 saw the terrorists use a far more potent method of suicide hijackers 
commandeering aircraft and crashing them into specific strategic targets with the 
intention of maximum casualties, economic disruption and media coverage. 
In the latest incident in Russia, there is a possibility of suicide bombers blowing up 


















D.      STAKEHOLDERS IN AVIATION SECURITY 
            The final nature of aviation security regimes and arrangements will depend on the 
interests, views, and influence of the various different stakeholders in aviation security. 
Elphinstone and Hancock set out the stakeholders as follows and much of what is 
presented are from their texts on Aviation Security Studies: 
Governments as regulators 
Governments have always felt that  they are not only one of the primary stakeholders 
but are the premier stakeholders. 
Elphinstone and Hancock explain why: “Without government support, no airline 
would operate into or out of any country. Without “flagship” airlines, many 
governments would have no recognition or presence in other countries. Throughout the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s governments were keen to attract commercial passenger 
services and freight as a way of building business and later tourist links…Airlines 
remain as important representatives of governments even in today’s contemporary 
aviation environment. Security is therefore of paramount concern to governments in 
promoting safe and reliable air travel…Once governments owned and operated many 
of the major world airlines and…operated many of the world’s major airports and 
associated infrastructure. 
The contemporary aviation environment has changed all that. Airlines and airports are 
saleable assets. Airlines and airports have been realising large profits for their former 
State owners and have been progressively sold to numerous high bidders. 
The experience of airports and airlines transferring from government to private 
ownership is mirrored in most free-market countries and cultures, although in some 
cases asset ownership is retained by a government while the “operating rights” are 
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leased to the corporate sector; i.e. a State owned airport may be retained and leased for 
a fixed “rental” to the corporate sector on a profit or loss share basis. 
This does not mean that governments lose their primary interest in the stakeholder 
“line-up”. On the contrary, whenever governments divest themselves of direct 
ownership of an enterprise, they often see a need to become more involved in the way 
the enterprise is regulated. 
Governments who are signatories to international aviation (ICAO) agreements, are also 
obliged under those agreements to implement local security regimes based on “local” 
laws, regulations and protocols and procedures. These regimes are required to align 
with all international agreements. However, there is no compulsion to do so. Each 
State may vary its local security profile while tacitly acknowledging endorsement of, 
and alignment with, each of the international security conventions. 
Herein, say Elphinstone and Hancock, “ lies a potentially serious problem - one that 
has in fact existed ever since the UN conventions were first promulgated. With some 
governments, written agreements to abide by world aviation codes of policy and 
practice may not translate into action. This problem surfaced on many occasions 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s when some governments were allegedly seen to be 
taking little or no action against hijackings and terrorism while other governments 
were recipients of deadly attacks…Whether or not governments have relinquished 
control of their aviation assets matters little. What does matter is that all governments, 
as primary stakeholders continue through effective regulation and policy to promote 
“best practice” on all matters associated with aviation operations - especially aviation 
security.” 
This is more so now that aviation itself is in the frontline in the worldwide war against 
terror. 
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Governments as policing agents of security 
Governments not only have a regulatory function, but have additional responsibilities 
in policing an array of national laws that have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of 
any security program. 
Elphinstone and Hancock list how “Governments have put in place a range of policing 
and support agencies to manage compliance and to manage threats and breaches. Some 
governments rely on military policing. Others rely on combinations of military and 
civil policing. Some governments insist on providing all support or indirect policing 
services such as immigration, customs, quarantine, passenger screening, cargo 
handling, airport security and air traffic control. Others effect indirect policing and 
support services by combining government resources with private sector involvement.” 
Until September 11, there was a growing shift to privatising civil aviation operations 
that saw a divesting of responsibility from government to the sub-contracted private 
sector. This did not mean, in most parts of the world, a lessening of any resolve to 
police and prosecute security breaches. In fact it may mean that regulations and the 
monitoring of contracted services will have to be strengthened and after September 11, 
the privatisation of security  may be reversed partly or completely. 
Nonetheless, clearly no government will ever opt out of participating in the business of 
controlling and policing commercial aviation. It is too important an industry with too 






Airline owners and operators 
With the transfer of airlines and airports to corporate ownership or private hands and 
the continuing need for security, the airlines must then re-define regulatory compliance 
in terms of what constitutes a good balance of business practice and legal obligations. 
Most airlines would be happy to leave the entire matter in state hands and even be 
prepared to pay for such services. But the better ones realise that good security can be 
a competitive edge and will do their own arrangements with or without state 
involvement. The former Deputy Chairman of Singapore Airlines, Dr Cheong Choong 
Kong, once said that “ Even more important than reliable, on time departures and 
arrivals, more important than excellent inflight service at a competitive price, is a high 
degree of safety and security”. Flight International Magazine reported once that 
“Airline passengers today are more aware of the need for airport and airline security, 
even to the point of making it a factor in choosing which service to use…” 
Nevertheless, the danger of privatisation is the diffusion of responsibility: each airline 
will determine how security programs will be implemented, each owner will 
differentially determine the commercial importance of security; each owner will 
allocate security resources to meet regulatory standards; levels of risk will be re-
assessed by each airline or airport owner/operator; and changes may therefore be made 
in the way security is prioritised. 
Most governments have recognised this now by paying for security and taking over 
coordination. For the airlines, there is still the burden of providing necessary policy 
and procedural documentation to all staff who may be required to understand security 
protocols, standards, etc., applicable to numerous countries serviced by the carrier, 
providing training to ensure compliance with in-flight and on-ground security 
programs, protocols and standards. 
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Airport owners and operators 
There are several issues that confront owners and operators of airports : the continuing 
global trend towards private airport ownership and consequent  challenge to balance  
of service and profitability, the development of new international airports and the 
importance of incorporating security in their design from the outset, the problem of 
airport use, expansion, development and the re-configuration of airport precincts to 
accommodate additional services and facilities, the on-going problem of aligning 
national and international regulations with the operational demands of airports as 
carrier numbers and  passenger and freight throughput  increase, the challenge of 
separating security issues of the three major air services - passenger, freight and 
general aviation - on the one hand and integrating them on the other and the recovery 
of aviation security costs. 
Freight forwarders 
Elphinstone and Hancock feel that while the management of freight (cargo) and mail 
services are as important as the management of passenger, airport and airline services 
they  continue to be the weak link by being  overlooked or  not given the same 
attention as passenger services: “The air shipment of freight and mail - whether as part 
of a regular passenger pay load or as a cargo-only despatch - is a vital part of every 
integrated aviation security program. There is no difference in terms of priority and 
there is no difference in the interpretation or applications of laws, procedures, etc. 
These laws and procedures, when applied to freight/mail services, must therefore 
receive the same high level of scrutiny as all other commercial aviation services. 
Freight/mail handling companies around the world have varying methods of protecting 
these assets and of protecting the personnel who form the total freight/mail shipment 
team. In some countries, freight forwarding is strictly controlled by government-owned 
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agencies, by delegation to the military or by delegation to the police. In other 
countries, the freight/mail business is managed by combinations of private sector and 
government-owned corporations. Some countries go to great lengths to screen and 
atmospherically test cargos; other countries employ partial screening or rely on a 
variety of checks and balances that hopefully fulfil the requirements of agreed security 
programs. 
There are also differences in the way freight forwarders are licensed to operate. Some 
countries carry out thorough and on-going checks of all staff engaged in the cargo 
despatch process, from first receipt of any goods to final loading. Other countries carry 
out minimal criminal or other clearance checks before licensing. Some countries may 
not licence or check at all. 
The handling and despatch of cargo is a vital link in a successful integrated aviation 
security chain.” 
Passengers 
After September 11, there has been a dramatic transformation in security doctrine for 
passengers. They  are expected to confront hijackers where the prior approach was to 
let the authorities take over all dealings with the hijackers. 
On the ground, passengers do not care whether the security is provided by the state or 
private forces so long as security is taken care of and service levels are maintained. Of 
course, passengers are also expected to be partners to ensure good security by bearing 
with some inconveniences and cooperating with the authorities. 
So an additional function of security forces is the need to educate the travelling public. 
Most passengers do realise that security is an important part of every flight and  are 
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generally willing to co-operate. At the same time, airports, airlines and governments 
are working hard to limit delays and personal intrusions. 
The travelling public have a stake in privatisation efforts through the feedback they 
give on the performance of security staff. 
Air crew 
Aircrew -  both cockpit and cabin – have also seen the similar change of doctrine in the 
need to confront hijackers. They also function as the security team when it comes to 
policing all pre-takeoff and in-flight security. Procedures are practised through training 
and re-training as part of crew accreditation. 
Not only do aircrew have to respond to terrorism and hijack incidents, but they are 
required to follow strictly regulated procedures in relation to the management of 
unruly passengers, the identification of suspicious packages, the carriage of VIP 
passengers, passengers as “persons-in-custody” or passengers “in peril”. 
Airport and airline ground staff 
This is one of the most contentious areas of aviation security and made more difficult 
because of the globalisation of work forces and the presence of a wide range of 
nationalities as aviation workers. Some of them bring along political and cultural 
baggage than can be exploited. 
Privatisation compounds this problem as state agencies usually are restricted to 
recruiting their own nationals whereas private organisations not only do not have this 
restriction but are more likely to recruit from outside because of lower costs.   
Elphinstone and Hancock agree that “it has traditionally been difficult for 
governments, carriers, airport management and police to agree on the levels of risk and 
to agree on the levels of security required for airport and airline ground staff. Levels 
and methods of policing ground staff security can be equally contentious…Staff 
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covered under this category include ground engineers, maintenance staff, aircraft 
refuellers, caterers, cleaners, drivers, baggage, mail and cargo handlers, despatchers, 
pre-boarding crew (which may include air crew) and security staff…All are required to 
have access to land-side and air-side precincts and most are required to either be in the 
vicinity of aircraft or to board aircraft. The need for reliable security clearance checks 
and the need for appropriate access control systems and regular supervision is stating 
the obvious. What is less obvious is how all ground staff are best “tracked” to ensure 
that the highest levels of security or maintained…Even when ground staff security is 
not deployed with such enforced rigour, all aviation security programs require 
procedures that are developed around a matrix of staff status and staff function (a 
professional or vocational job or task sub-category). This matrix governs the options 
for access control determined by regulations and operational requirements.” 
Airline and airport services sub-contractors 
The  difficulties of  managing security for airport employees is compounded by the he 
difficulties for the wide range of suppliers and contractors who enter airports  to 
deliver goods and building materials, to work on construction sites or normal or 
facilities maintenance, to service systems equipment, to work in the commercial units, 
and as transportation workers. 
Privatisation adds to the difficulty by the contracting out of  both land-side and air-side 
services and  the inability of private forces to screen their workers. The development of 
new international airports as virtual cities and the expansion or re-configuration of 
existing airports to cope with the explosion in tourism, visitor numbers, commercial 
operations and freight handling add to the problems of policing. 
Airport visitors 
Airports will continue to fascinate and attract visitors  and made more so because of 
the marketing that airports are beneficial social, commercial and recreational 
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destinations. Airport designers  now provide large viewing areas for visitors - viewing 
areas that are located as close as possible to aircraft action. Designers have also begun 
to link commercial opportunities with recreation opportunities, providing gymnasiums, 
games parlours, conference facilities, restaurants and cinemas. 
Most major international airports now have links with inter-city and intra-city ground 
transport, making it even easier to bring visitors from longer distances who are then 
able to stay for longer periods. 
This, of course makes security even more onerous , when it has to be balanced with the 
expectations of pleasure. 
Airport-adjacent communities 
Airport planning and  expansion must now take into consideration  environmental 
concerns, in the way they are  accessed,  located and  relate to neighbouring zoned 
space. This, plus the new threats of ground-launched missiles against aircraft, pose  
another security dilemma. When airport development debates remain un-resolved, 
there are real fears of increased risk from disgruntled protesters, from residents or 
employees at neighbouring sites - especially where those sites have commercial links 
with an airport or where air services must daily proceed under threat from breaches of 








E.  RECOVERY OF COSTS 
 
The manner in which aviation security costs are charged or recovered has a major 
impact on the choice of privatisation arrangements. The state will prefer to minimise 
its costs by leaving the charges to the private sector and this avoids political and other 
costs, while the private sector do not want to be seen charging for this service and have 
always wanted the state to bear them. The different methods used or contemplated by 
authorities all over the world, and gleaned from my participation in the audit of NZ 
AVSEC in 1997, are as follows: 
1 Method A 
 Charge on airports at a fixed rate per passenger 
1.1 This is a charge on all airports based on a nationwide fixed rate per passenger 
departing through that airport. The process of collection will differ between 
airports. 
1.2       Most airports recover the amount of the security charge by incorporating a 
security component in charges levied on departing passengers. 
The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
            Advantages 
 A national charge is consistent with a national aviation security service and a 
national police service, if this is the desired organisational structure. 
 Administration is relatively easy and the collection cost is low. 
 Collection is combined with the Airport Departure Charge or Tax, which is 
convenient to the public. 
           The statutory charge is relatively static and is not subjected to short term cost                                                      
v          variations eg. different rates set annually. 
            Disadvantages  
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 The way revenue is generated, which is based on passenger throughput, does 
not necessarily bear any relationship to the costs incurred for aviation security, 
eg. the costs for operational security of airports is not based on passenger 
numbers.  
 Results in cross subsidisation between airports. 
 Lack of direct incentive for the security service provider to improve 
efficiencies, accountabilities and further reduce costs. 
2 Method B 
Charge on airports based on costs at each airport 
2.1 This method would involve a charge on each airport based on an estimate of 
total aviation security costs at the airport and estimated  passenger throughput 
at that airport to give a rate per passenger specific to that airport. 
2.2 Airports, if they choose, have the ability to recover this cost through on 
charging to passengers or through any other of their revenue sources. 
The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
            Advantages 
 There would be a more direct relationship between the cost of the services 
provided to the airport and the charge for those services. 
 Does not result in cross-subsidisation between airports, as each airport is 
individually charged for the services provided at that airport. 
           Airports have the autonomy to decide whether to on-charge the costs of                           
aviation security to passengers or other airport customers. 
            Disadvantages 
 An annual adjustment may be required to reflect the difference in 
forecast  estimated rate per passenger charged to the airport and the actual rate 
per passenger based on actual total aviation security costs for that year. 
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 The public would pay different charges at each airport and this may result in 
widely different departure charges if the airports decide to pass the security 
costs on to passengers. 
 Because of the need to change regulations, if the amounts charged to each 
airport change as costs fluctuate, changes may be required at frequent intervals, 
say annually, and this could be time consuming. 
3 Method C 
Charge on passengers – Averaged nationally 
3.1 This method would involve a charge for aviation security services levied on  
departing passengers which would be collected separately from any airport 
charge. The aviation security charge calculation would be averaged over the 
country, based on total estimated costs of aviation security for the country 
divided by estimated total number of international departing passengers.  
 
            The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
             Advantages 
 The aviation security charge would be identified separately and therefore is 
             more transparent in terms of having a breakdown of the components of the             
departure  charge. 
 The aviation security charge is uniform for departing passengers irrespective of 
the airport from which they depart. 
            Disadvantages 
 It would be inconvenient for passengers to pay separately for an aviation 
security charge and a departure charge as it would add another step in the 
departure procedures. 
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 Administration costs would be higher than at present due to the need to collect 
the aviation security charge separately. 
 Additional administration costs would be incurred to gather information, 
calculate the charge and review it on an annual basis. 
 Since the charge is calculated based on estimated figures, there is a likelihood 
of an over or under recovery of actual costs. In this event there is no ability to 
recover or refund monies owned to the passengers concerned. 
 There is a potential for cross-subsidisation between passengers to occur if an 
under or over recovery results from one year to the next. 
 There would be cross-subsidisation between airports. 
 By charging passengers directly, the incentives for the security service provider 
to introduce efficiencies, accountabilities and reduce costs are harder to define. 
4 Method D 
Charge on passengers based on costs at the airport 
4.1 This method would involve a charge on international departing passengers 
collected separately from any airport charge and based on estimated costs of 
total aviation security at that airport divided by the estimated total number of 
departing passengers from that airport. 
The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
            Advantages 
 The aviation security charge would be identified separately and therefore 
passengers would know the cost of aviation security per passenger at that 
airport. 
 There would be no cross-subsidisation across airports. 
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 There would be a direct relationship between the cost of the services provided 
at the airport and the charge for those services. 
           Disadvantages 
 It would be inconvenient for passengers to pay separately for an aviation 
security charge and a departure charge as it would add another step in the 
departure procedures. 
 Administration costs would be higher than at present due to the need to collect 
the aviation security charge separately. 
 Additional administration costs would be incurred to gather information, 
calculate the charge and review it on an annual basis. 
 Since the charge is calculated based on estimated figures, there is a likelihood 
of an over or under recovery of actual costs. In this event there is no ability to 
recover or refund monies owed to the passengers concerned. 
 There is a potential for cross-subsidisation between passengers to occur if an 
under or over recovery results from one year to the next. 
 The public would pay different charges at each airport and would need to check 
to find out how much it is. 
5 Method E 
Direct charges to airports of actual costs 
5.1 This method would involve a direct charge by way of invoice form the security 
service provider independently, to each airport, for aviation security services 
provided at that airport. 
5.2 The direct charge for the provision of aviation services would be based on the 
actual costs incurred at each airport and invoiced to each airport company. 
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The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
           Advantages 
 There would be direct relationship between the cost of the services provided at 
the airport and the charge for those services. 
 It would remove cross-subsidisation between airports. 
 Charges are based on actual costs incurred which avoids the need to estimate 
costs for aviation security services or departing passenger numbers. 
 The quality and efficiency of aviation services could be more easily monitored. 
            Disadvantages  
 If the airports effectively on-charge their individual costs for aviation security 
to passengers then this may result in different charges at each airport. 
 Administration costs may be significantly higher due to the number of airports, 
and the fact that costs would be calculated and charged individually to each 
airport. 
 The timing of invoices raised may vary depending on the method by which 
costs are calculated and charged, eg. in advance or in arrears. There will need 
to be a reconciliation and possibly a subsequent annual adjustment. 
6 Method F 
Direct charges to organisations of actual costs 
6.1 This method would involve a direct charge by way of invoice from the security 
service provider independently to each of the  organisations receiving aviation 
security services. These could include all airlines and airport organisations. 




The main advantages and disadvantages of this method are: 
            Advantages  
 Costs would be shared by all the major organisations receiving the benefits of 
aviation security services. 
 As the basis for charging is actual rather than estimated costs, there would be a 
direct relationship between the cost of the services provided to the purchasers 
of aviation security services and the charge for those services. 
            It is likely to remove cross-subsidisation between airports. 
 It allows for different arrangements for different organizations according to                      
threat levels and needs on a user pay basis.     
           Disadvantages  
 Administration costs may be higher due to the number of organisations 
involved. 
 It would increase administration costs for the security service provider as all 
airports and airlines would need to be invoiced separately at agreed intervals 
and on agreed bases, eg. monthly, in advance or arrears. 
 This method would require determining the purchasers’ differing utilisation 
rates of aviation security services. Utilisation may alter frequently eg. airline 
timetable changes thus requiring re-calculation. 
 Efficiency and productivity gains may not be achieved due to the number of 






7 Comparison of Methods 
7.1 A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages in relation to the methods 
outlined above are summarised below: 
 
Advantages/Disadvantages Methods 
 A B C D E F 
Removes cross-subsidisation across 
airports 
 √  √ √ √ 
       
Low administration/compliance costs √      
       
Improved accountabilities/efficiencies     √  
       
Relationship between costs and the charge  √  √ √ √ 
       
Transparency of charge as charges 
separately 
  √ √   
       
Increase in administration/compliance costs   √ √ √ √ 
       
Annual reconciliation and adjustment  √   ? ? 
       
Cross-subsidisation between passengers   √ √   
       
Different charges per airport  √  √ √ √ 
       
Additional step to pay a separate charge   √ √   
  




The choice of method will depend on the aviation security arrangements. The US, 
India, New Zealand, and China with their Federal models and single agency, prefer 
one standard fee on all passengers nationwide. It is not one of the most financially 
efficient methods but is convenient and politically more palatable. 
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Singapore, with its multi agency arrangement, goes for a mix, with a national security 
tax on all passengers for common services such as the checks on persons and hand-
carried bags at the departure gates, which is done by the State, and separate invoices by 
non-state security service providers for services at check-in, which vary by airline, and 
for additional services according to threat levels. The state is not seen discriminating 
for one airline against another as private organizations provide and charge for the 
extras. The exception is in cases of emergencies, like hijacks, where the state takes 
over and absorbs the entire cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
